As Washington once again raises the prospect of confrontation with Tehran, questions about U.S. intentions—and the limits of American power—have returned to the center of debate in West Asia. In an exclusive interview with the Tehran Times, Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector and U.S. Marine intelligence officer, discussed how Washington views talks with Iran, what it hopes to achieve with the country, as well as the growing risk of military escalation.
Ritter believes that the United States is using diplomacy less as a route to agreement than as a tactical tool to buy time, apply pressure, and shape the conditions for confrontation. In his remarks to the Tehran Times, he outlined what he sees as the real thinking behind U.S. and Israeli demands, warned against misreading Iran’s deterrence, and described the potentially catastrophic consequences of a war for the region—and far beyond.
Read the full text of the interview below.
Trump has called regime change in Iran “the best thing that could happen.” From your perspective, how realistic is it that the U.S. could actually achieve that, and are there any historical examples that help put this into context?
It is important to understand that when President Trump articulates regime change in the way he has, it reflects official U.S. policy. Iran should not be misled into believing that there is any pathway to the normalization of relations through negotiations. Negotiations, in this context, serve purely as a pretext to prepare the ground for a regime-change operation.
The United States has a long history of carrying out regime-change operations in other countries. The operation against Saddam Hussein in Iraq, for example, was a decades-long effort. Muammar Gaddafi, Bashar al-Assad, and Nicolás Maduro are other cases often cited. The fact remains that the United States has repeatedly sought to remove targeted governments from power.
These statements are not made in a vacuum. They are tied to a broader policy framework and to concrete measures that are already underway. Iran has recently endured a period of severe violence orchestrated by the United States and Israel with the explicit aim of weakening the Iranian system in pursuit of regime change. This is not a hypothetical scenario; it is a real policy and a genuine threat to Iran.
There’s a lot of talk in the U.S. about precision strikes versus a full-scale invasion. If a limited air campaign happened, what do you think would be the first targets, and how might that affect the region as a whole?
It is clear that there are two types of strikes the United States could consider. One would be a so-called demonstration strike, similar to what occurred at the end of the 12-day war—a short, symbolic attack designed to demonstrate American power and allow Washington to posture without achieving any substantive outcome. Such strikes are typically employed when the United States recognizes that it cannot realistically achieve its ultimate objectives.
If, however, the United States moves beyond a demonstration strike, it would signal a commitment to a decisive and existential outcome for Iran—namely, regime change. That represents a fundamentally different approach, and it is closely tied to domestic American politics. It is important for Iranians to understand that U.S. policy toward Iran is deeply influenced by internal political considerations.
The current U.S. president faces a critical midterm election in November and is already under significant political pressure due to domestic issues, including immigration policies, the role of ICE, and the deployment of militarized police forces in American cities. He risks losing control of the House of Representatives, which could expose him to impeachment proceedings during the second half of his term—an outcome he is keen to avoid.
The president campaigned on a promise to avoid major wars in the Middle East. If the United States were to enter a large-scale regime-change war with Iran, he would need to secure a clear and decisive victory. Failure to do so would likely be politically devastating. This calculation is central to current U.S. decision-making.
There is ongoing discussion about a week-long military operation against Iran, and such an operation would be designed to be decisive, with the explicit goal of bringing down the Islamic Republic. This possibility must be taken seriously. At the same time, the political risks involved may ultimately prevent the president from making such a decision. Without a guaranteed outcome in terms of regime change, the United States could become trapped in an open-ended conflict—something that would carry severe political consequences for him at home.
Trump has sent mixed signals — hoping for talks but keeping military options on the table. How should Tehran and Washington interpret this, and what does it tell us about U.S. intentions?
I do not believe Donald Trump is sending mixed signals. He has been explicit that regime change is the desired outcome. His objective is regime change.
Negotiations are currently taking place in Geneva, but these talks should not be taken at face value.
The negotiations are a diplomatic ploy. The United States has already proven, especially under Donald Trump, that negotiations can be a tool of perfidy—where we lure the Iranians into believing there’s a negotiated outcome and then bomb them. We saw that with the 12-day war, where Iran was told there would be meetings on Monday, but they got bombed on Friday. Donald Trump bragged about this. He literally bragged about setting Iran up for that.
So why would the Iranians suddenly believe that Donald Trump is serious about negotiations in Geneva? He’s not.
He has said this week, while talking about the negotiations, that regime change is the desired outcome. These negotiations are simply being done to set Iran up for a regime change operation—to buy time for the United States to assemble the military force necessary to carry out a targeted regime change operation.
Israel is demanding Iran dismantle its nuclear program, limit missiles, and end support for regional allies. Do these conditions aim at real diplomacy, or do they make war more likely? How much do you think Israel’s stance influences U.S. policy, and where might their interests diverge?
On Iran, I don’t believe their interests diverge at all. Both sides seek regime change. So, the Israeli conditions are really designed to ensure that there can never be a negotiated outcome. Let’s be honest: if it weren’t for Iran’s ballistic missile programs, Iran wouldn’t exist today as an Islamic Republic. It would have already been destroyed. The only thing that keeps Iran viable is the fact that it has this deterrence—this ballistic missile capability that can harm Israel and destroy American bases in the region.
So what Israel is saying is that they want Iran to negotiate away the one thing that gives it the ability to survive militarily under current conditions. The nuclear program—that’s up to Iran. It’s an Iranian issue. I think there is a consensus, and I agree with it, that it’s a peaceful nuclear program. Iran has put a lot of pride into it; this is national pride.
There is some flexibility on the nuclear program for negotiation. I believe Iran is trying to find a window of negotiation opportunity. But it doesn’t matter, because the United States isn’t looking for a nuclear deal. The United States is looking for regime change. That’s it. If Iran agreed to give up its nuclear program today, that would not satisfy them. They would want the missiles. They would want a change in Iran’s posture.
When we speak of Iran’s support for regional allies—like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and others—Iran is defending resistance movements that are targeting Israel. And they are not targeting Israel in a vacuum; they are responding to Israeli aggressive behavior. Hamas is defending against genocide in Gaza and against Israeli occupation of Lebanon. The Houthis are supporting Hamas. So it’s all legitimate.
Israel is basically saying, “You must stop doing anything that interferes with our ability to project the greater Israeli vision.” That’s telling Iran, a nation of 90 million people, one of the largest in the region, that they are not allowed to have a sphere of interest, not allowed to have national security interests. It’s absurd. It effectively means Iran ceases to exist.
That is what Israel wants: Iran to negotiate the end of its existence. Since the United States backs those terms, that’s the American posture as well. I think it’s time for the Iranians to understand that they are in a very, very difficult position. There will be no negotiation. The United States and Israel are looking to bring an end to the Islamic Republic, and these negotiations are simply a means of buying time and lowering Iran’s guard.
As long as there are negotiations, now moved to Geneva, it gives an air of credibility. The Iranians lose their guard; they think maybe there will be a negotiated outcome. They drop their guard at home, and then they get bombed. Again, Iran is a sovereign state and can do whatever it wants. But if I were advising the Iranians, I would say that they need to understand that these negotiations are going nowhere—they are simply a tool to set Iran up for a regime change operation.
Iranians will not give up their missile program as a deterrence. Negotiations are just a show, and you said it: a direct attack by the US on Iran would be a huge risk for Trump.
So you think that Israel and the U.S. are trying to find a solution for regime change besides war, something other than a direct airstrike?
Well, look—we know, for instance, the absurdity of the situation. Jared Kushner, who is 50% of the American negotiating team, is actively meeting with the Iranian diaspora here in the United States to form a new Iranian government.
So the man who’s negotiating with Iran to solve issues is also meeting in the U.S. to create a new government.
What that means is the negotiations aren’t serious. They’re to buy time—buy time so that the U.S. can find a replacement for this regime, to find a leader, to undermine support for the regime inside Iran. The goal here isn’t to have American boots on the ground occupying Iran. The goal is to create sufficient unrest inside Iran so that the government collapses and is replaced by something new.
And you’ve seen this repeatedly. For instance, the unrest in 2023 in the aftermath
We saw legitimate outrage on the part of Iranians in the streets, which was then hijacked by foreign-backed sponsors to turn it into a nationwide wave of violence. That was designed to bring about the collapse of the regime. I remember talking to President Raisi in September 2023. He said that this was one of the most difficult tests that the Islamic Revolution—the Islamic Republic—had undergone. It was a very difficult test, but they had passed it. They came through. Iran was stronger, more united.
But then we see what just happened: the United States, on its own admission, orchestrates a currency collapse in Iran. People went to the streets in legitimate protest, which the Iranian government did not violently suppress. Then that protest was hijacked by the CIA, by Mossad, with agents inside who created violence.
Now, you have to ask yourself: why would they repeat these operations like this? The answer is that they are collecting intelligence about how Iran operates, how Iran responds, what communications take place, and where the leadership nodes are. This information is being put into a database that will be used for military targets.
So, when we bomb Iran—and I unfortunately believe that we will bomb Iran—we will be seeking to suppress the regime’s ability to respond to civil unrest. We will encourage uprisings and suppress the government’s capacity to respond. The objective, therefore, is to have the government collapse. And it won’t be the people in the streets. I don’t see the Iranian people going into the streets in the millions to get rid of the Islamic regime.
I see—I see the opposite. I see the Iranian people supporting the Islamic Republic. But at some point, a few people will stay at home, and the next thing you know, you’re going to have ISIS-type trucks running through your cities, with gunmen from the Mujahedin-e Khalq and gunmen from the monarchists, who are going to run in and say, “We’re now in charge.” That, I think, is the vision of the United States.
Because anybody who knows anything about Iran is confronted by the fact that the Iranian people are largely satisfied with the government they have. There are issues, of course, and we saw that. I mean, look at one of the great moments in 2023: there was violence in the streets because of the hijab. Today, women are walking in demonstrations in support of the government, not wearing the hijab, because the government has said, “We respect a woman’s right to choose.” If that’s not a government listening to its people, I don’t know what is.
Iran is a democracy. We tend to forget that here in the West. Iran is a functioning democracy, where the people have voted for a president, voted for a parliament, and voted for the Assembly of Experts, which oversees the Supreme Leader. So it’s democratic across the board. I think the Iranian people have grown accustomed to their democracy, and I don’t think they are looking for a regime change.
But again, if you can intimidate people to stay at home, stay off the streets, be scared, then you can come in with a minority that can seize control. I think that’s the goal of the United States right now: to suppress the regime, intimidate the people into silence, and then inject these forces that will seek to take over. Then Jared Kushner’s business club will move in and claim that they are in charge of Iran.
Do I think this will work? No.
But I think this is the plan.
So, if the U.S. bombs Iran, what would be the immediate and long-term effects on the Middle East and the energy markets?
That’s really up to Iran. Iran has repeatedly indicated that it has the ability to shut down energy production in the Middle East and to close the Strait of Hormuz—but they have never taken that step.
A lot of people believe Iran is bluffing, that it won’t actually do it, and therefore we shouldn’t be intimidated. But it’s a big deal. If Iran were to attack, for instance, Azerbaijani oil production, Saudi Arabian oil production, United Arab Emirates oil production, or Qatari gas production, the end result would be a global energy crisis—the collapse of the global economy. It would be catastrophic for Iran as well. That’s why the Iranians haven’t done it; it’s existential. It would take everybody down along with Iran, devastate Iran’s oil economy, and lead to regional chaos and anarchy.
If Iran were to follow through on its promises, it would be a fatal blow to many economies around the world. But Iran hasn’t done it because the Iranians are responsible governors. They’re not seeking a suicidal event—they’re seeking an outcome that allows everybody to live in peace and harmony.
What you’d be looking at, first and foremost, is that Iran has said—and they need to follow through if they want to be taken seriously—that any attack on Iran will involve massive retaliation against Israel. It’s absolutely essential that Israel be punished as harshly as possible. The Iranians know that their targeting of Israel has been very constrained in the past because Iran wasn’t trying to destroy Israel; it was trying to end a conflict.
But this time, the bottom line is: if there is a military attack against Iran, it’s because the goal is to destroy Iran and eliminate the Islamic Republic. It is time, therefore, that Iran let Israel know it will pay the ultimate price and that Israel’s ability to function as a modern nation-state must be taken away. Iran knows what those targets are—they know what to hit—and they need to act early. Confronting Israel with its existential survival is one of the quickest ways to bring an end to this war.
The other thing is—and as an American, this pains me to say, and I hope it never comes to this—Iran needs to make the price that America pays for this war unacceptably high. Iran has proven in the past that it has the ability to limit casualties. Thank you. As an American, I thank you—I don’t want harm brought to my fellow Americans.
But when we’re talking about existential survival, if Iran goes easy on America, the U.S. will just continue to strike Iran hard. I think it’s essential that Iran let the United States know upfront what the price will be, and that there are no questions about this: if the United States chooses to attack Iran, Iran will have no choice but to immediately strike the United States in a manner that brings about maximum harm to Americans in the region.
I hope that by saying this, the United States will refrain from bombing Iran, and lives will be saved—both Iranian and American.
Iran has always held back, has always been reticent, and has never delivered the knockout punch because it has always kept the door open for a negotiated settlement. But this time, if the United States attacks, it will be because they have decided to collapse the Iranian regime. The Iranian regime will then either allow itself to be collapsed or defend itself.
Do you think the U.S. is envisioning a scenario for Iran similar to what happened in Syria — years of civil war and destruction of infrastructure, followed by the emergence of a new leadership?
I think it’s possible. Anything is possible. My assessment — and Iranians can disagree since I’m an outsider — is that for many decades Iran sought to be part of the West, to be seen as integrated into Western society. Under the Shah there were strong ties, and even afterward there have been elements within Iran that want normalized relations with the West, believing that is the path to economic prosperity. As long as Iranians hold that belief, they remain vulnerable.
If we look at the Venezuela operation, the CIA essentially bought off large segments of the country. They created the notion that if Venezuela just got rid of Maduro, economic conditions would improve — oil sales would grow and everyone would benefit. That strategy worked to the extent it did because the CIA was able to buy influence.
Look at the last operation that was in Iran. How did, how did the Mossad and the United States, gain such access to Iran so that we could have people in the streets? We bought them over the years. When Iranians travel abroad, the CIA and the Mossad will recruit them, bring them under their wing, and bring them back. They’ll recruit. They create cells. They do this because they believe that the pathway for Iranian prosperity is to the West.
There are Iranian politicians and businessmen who still hope normalization with the West is possible, and that creates a window of vulnerability because that can be exploited. I think that’s what the United States is seeking to do over time: to isolate Iran, create economic difficulties in Iran, hold out the prospects of economic rejuvenation by engaging with the West, and get a significant segment of the Iranian population to believe that the best path is to the West and then they will betray the revolution by taking CIA money and start working for the CIA, and we’ll do that over time. This is what happened to Bashar al Assad.
Russia and Iran successfully intervened to bolster Assad against the forces of ISIS and al Qaeda, but once they militarily won, when Russia and Iran were telling Bashar al Assad that reforms needed to be made and that things had to change, instead he went to the Arab League, saying, well, the easy route will be for me to reintegrate into the Arab world, into the Arab League. He opened the door, and the CIA and Mossad and others used that opening to buy off everybody in his leadership so that when Jolani launched his attack, the generals and the governors and the politicians who were supposed to be standing with Assad weren’t standing with Assad. They had already sold out.
And I think that’s the goal and objective of the United States. I believe that we are actively looking for people inside Iran and we’re promising them that if they stand by and do nothing, um, that they will have a better future. And so we’re seeking to buy them off. And that’s the strategy, that’s the long‑term strategy — it’s a strategy that we’ve used in Iraq, we’ve used in Syria, and we’ve used in Venezuela. It’s a strategy we’re using in Russia, uh, trying to undermine the government of Vladimir Putin by buying off Russian political and economic elites. It’s a strategy that we will use in Iran.
What do you think about the role of Russia and China? Could their involvement stop a U.S. attack, or does it give Iran more leverage amid these tensions?
Well, I don’t know the specifics of the Russian-Iranian security agreement. It’s a classified document. And I don’t know the specifics of any similar agreement between Iran and China. What I will say is that I don’t believe that Russia and Iran have an Article 5–type relationship similar to what exists in NATO—where an attack against one is an attack against all. And I don’t believe China and Iran have that either. So ultimately, if the United States attacks Iran, Iran will be on its own. It will be required to defend itself.
Russia and China are providing intelligence support, I believe, and material support, and they will provide political support as well. I think one of the goals is to strengthen Iran to the point where the United States will find it impossible to believe they can achieve military victory. That’s why you see a lot of equipment flying in. But the United States, unfortunately, is pretty good at fighting, and so we have people who think they can overcome these defenses and things of that nature.
Ultimately, it comes down to a matter of will for Iran. It’s not just that Iran needs to ensure that the United States and Israel understand there will be a military consequence for attacking Iran. Iran also needs to withstand the hybrid warfare—the mental war—that’s going on. There are people actively working to undermine confidence in the minds of the Iranian people toward their government. There’s active propaganda designed to get the people of Iran to doubt the ability of their government to effectively govern.
If Iran doesn’t resolve that problem, it creates a window of vulnerability that the CIA believes it can exploit. So, Iran needs to shut down both venues. They need to make sure people understand there will be a heavy price to pay militarily. But they also need to ensure that people understand there’s no chance whatsoever to undermine Iran from within.
I don’t believe that Iran is vulnerable. When you look at the millions of people who went into the streets in support of the Iranian government in the aftermath of these events, I don’t believe they were paid to go into the streets. That’s the propaganda in the West—that they were paid or intimidated. If they didn’t go, they would be beaten. I think they win the streets because they legitimately support Iran and the Islamic Republic.
There has to be a way for Iran to capture that emotion and use it to weaponize itself, to make itself invulnerable to efforts by outside powers to divide it. That’s what we try to do. We support the MEK, we support the monarchists, we support the Kurds, we support Azeri separatists, we support the Baluch, and we exploit economic divisions in the mainstream Iranian population. The United States, Israel, and others are looking to fracture Iran, to break it apart, to cause it to collapse from within.
The Iranian government and the Iranian people have to find a way to unify themselves. If not, then we’ve just told you what we look for: the divisions, and we exploit the divisions.
Let me make one last point, if I may, because some people might listen to this and say that I’m anti-American, and that’s not the case at all. I’m as pro-American as it gets. My posture as an American is to avoid a war that doesn’t need to be fought.
There are legitimate concerns everywhere, about many different issues, and there are people who say they would like Iran to do this, that, or the other thing. These issues should be resolved through negotiation, through discussion, and by seeking equitable outcomes that don’t involve violence.
But right now, the United States is choosing the tool of violence. My goal is to create the conditions in which my fellow Americans understand that this tool won’t work—that it won’t achieve the outcome they want. That’s why I’m talking to you the way that I am. I’m not doing this because I’m anti-American. I’m doing this because I’m pro-American—because I love my country, because I respect the men and women who wear the uniform and who will pay the ultimate price if we go to war against Iran.
I’m also an American who has been to Iran and who has met the Iranian people. You are kind, cultured, and generous people, and you don’t deserve to have war thrust upon you. We need to find a way to avoid an unnecessary conflict between our peoples.
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