The time has come to wrap up another year.
In North Korea, the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea typically holds a plenary meeting in late December to review the year’s projects and draw up plans for the next year.
But things are a little different this year. The 13th plenary meeting of the Eighth Central Committee is scheduled to be held sooner than normal, in mid-December.
Background
Considering that the Central Committee’s December plenary meeting has come to replace Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s address, it’s worth asking why North Korea is holding that meeting two weeks early, in mid-December, instead of at the end of the month.
Pyongyang mouthpiece the Korean Central News Agency reported on Nov. 1 that the Political Bureau of the Eighth Central Committee had decided to hold its 13th plenary session in mid-December to assess the implementation of party and state policy this year and to resolve major issues including preparations for the Ninth Party Congress.
There appear to be two major differences between this plenary meeting of the Central Committee leading up to next year’s Ninth Party Congress and the lead-up to the Eighth Party Congress (Jan. 5–12, 2021) five years ago. First, the announcement that the Eighth Party Congress would be held in early January was made during a Dec. 19 meeting of the Political Bureau, rather than a plenary meeting of the Central Committee.
An even more notable difference is that since the Central Committee didn’t hold a plenary meeting before the Eighth Party Congress to review the year’s work, that review had to be crammed into the congress’s retrospective of the past five years and discussion of the next five-year plan.
Incidentally, the plenary meeting held on the sixth day of the Eighth Party Congress was attended by newly elected members of the Central Committee, including the general secretary himself.
These differences are worth noting because they’re prompting many analysts to suggest that the Ninth Party Congress may be delayed until February or later. (A party congress is North Korea’s biggest political event, when the regime assesses progress over the last five years, sets new goals and drafts a new five-year plan.)
Likely scenarios
Considering that the Central Committee is holding a separate end-of-the-year plenary session to review the past year’s work and make major decisions about preparations for the Ninth Party Congress—and in light of the increasing political fluidity around the Korean Peninsula and the increasing frequency of Kim Jong Un’s on-the-spot guidance and instructions—it’s plausible that Kim has ordered officials to take their time in drawing up the next five-year plan and preparing for the Ninth Party Congress to maximize its impact.
In that case, the party congress being held immediately after the Central Committee’s plenary meeting may not be the only feasible scenario. We may also want to consider the following: (1) The 13th plenary meeting is held in mid-December (to review preparations for the congress); (2) Kim Jong Un delivers a New Year’s address on Jan. 1 (resuming his former practice); (3) the Central Committee’s Political Bureau convenes in mid-January (making a final review of congress plans and announcing the specific schedule); and (4) the congress is held alongside other organizational conferences in February or beyond.
Key agenda items
As disclosed in the Political Bureau’s announcement of the Central Committee’s upcoming plenary meeting in early November, the meeting’s agenda will focus on (1) reviewing the implementation of party and state policies in 2025 and (2) preparing for the Ninth Party Congress while also including (3) routine items such as personnel, organizational and policy matters; finalizing this year’s budget; and drawing up a budget for next year.
The personnel and organizational discussion will be limited to minor issues such as making an example of officials who have harmed the party (an issue often stressed by Kim), while the policy discussion will be oriented toward boosting support for pressing issues such as social controls and Kim’s signature 20×10 regional development policy.
If North Korea wants to send a message about resuming inter-Korean exchange and cooperation or returning to denuclearization talks—items of keen interest both to the South Korean government and to the international community—any such message would be reserved for the main event (i.e., the Ninth Party Congress). Nothing of the sort is likely to emerge from the upcoming plenary meeting, considering that Kim already issued uncompromising guidelines in a speech before the Supreme People’s Assembly back in September.
Wrapping up
To sum up, the Central Committee’s plenary meeting in mid-December is expected to be a nuts-and-bolts policy meeting that will focus on (1) reviewing this year’s progress in various areas and (2) supporting preparations for the Ninth Party Congress, which is supposed to lay the groundwork for the next five years.
Allow me to revisit a point I’ve made before: when it comes to North Korea, we must not allow ourselves to dwell on the past, indulge in wishful thinking or underestimate the regime. Let’s recall that Kim Jong Un, tyrant as he may be, is constantly making daring decisions and adopting new stances, and that the situation on the Korean Peninsula is changing by the day—and sometimes, by the hour.
Disclaimer : This story is auto aggregated by a computer programme and has not been created or edited by DOWNTHENEWS. Publisher: dailynk.com
