IDBI’s stake sale of 60.72 per cent, owned jointly by the government, and LIC, the state-owned insurer, to Fairfax Financial for Rs 52,878 crore is not a simple case of privatisation, or a banking takeover. It involves political legitimacy, valuation concerns and social value.
The political costs are visible. Opposition parties, IDBI employees and critics question and protest the deal. Congress’ Rahul Gandhi challenges the transfer of control. The ruling establishment defends it.
In financial terms, some experts contend that the sale is undervalued, and the bid amount is lower than the initial reserve price. Arunish Chawla, secretary, department of investment and public asset management, which manages privatisation of public assets, clarified that the reserve price (Rs 94.42 per share), higher than the deal price (Rs 81 per share), became “functus officio (lost its legal effect)”. This was because the government renegotiated the price with Fairfax when it did not receive any offer above the reserve price during the public auction. The policymakers decided that scrapping the auction and restarting the process from scratch would be a “futile exercise”, with minimal chance “finding another buyer willing to pay nearly Rs 50,000 crore”.
Many other charges cloud the IDBI sale. Opposition claims that several assets, especially the land banks with IDBI, are not adequately reflected and included in Fairfax’s price. In addition, the bank has among the lowest non-performing assets, and earns huge profits. A revolving-door-related issue hints at possible conflicts of interest. Although there are no direct links, Amitabh Kant, an IAS officer of 1980 batch of Kerala cadre, former CEO of Niti Aayog (2016-22), became Fairfax’s senior adviser in June 2025. This merits scrutiny due to Mr Kant’s earlier role in the disinvestment process. There are other names, who are linked to both LIC, one of the sellers, and Fairfax. At present, public records do not establish any connections between Kant/Niti Aayog and IDBI. In social terms, employees worry about their futures. One cannot say if IDBI, once privatised, will cater to social needs.
IPS deputation: Control over paramilitary forces
Despite a Supreme Court order, the Centre continues to induct IPS officers in Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs). The apex court’s directive was to progressively reduce such deputations in phases, and within two years. While the issue focuses on the role of the Home ministry, it indicates an unusual power tussle in the uniformed establishment.
Between May 2025 and September 2026, 46 IPS were deputed to five forces: 13 to BSF, 11 to CISF, nine to CRPF, six to ITBP and seven to SSB. Here are some examples. Himachal Pradesh-cadre officer Ajay Kumar Yadav (1996 batch) was appointed ADG, CRPF, on November 6, 2026. Shrihari Pandey (West Bengal cadre, 2011 batch) joined CRPF as DIG, and Tripti Bhatt (Uttarakhand, 2013) became an SP in CBI. On September 2, 2026, SC sought an explanation from Home secretary Govind Mohan on the continuation of the appointments. The government argued that progressive reduction did not imply an outright ban. The deputations were triggered by requisitions from forces’ chiefs.
The controversy exposes a deeper divide. CAPF officers demand opportunities in senior positions. They add that deputations of IPS officers lead to the latter’s dominance, and restricts career progressions of the CAPF officers. In another development, which concerns the IPS cadre, the Home ministry tightened career-related conditions for younger IPS officers. From the 2011 batch onwards, there is a mandatory and minimum two-year Central deputation at SP or DIG level for empanelment as IG at the Centre. Although the move addresses vacancies, it raises questions about cadre autonomy and career advancement.
Sajjan Yadav takes charge in J&K
The appointment of Sajjan Singh Yadav (1995 batch) as chief secretary of Jammu and Kashmir has turned into a test that will contest authority, seniority and influence. For the first time, an officer from the AGMUT cadre inherits a secretariat with senior members and entrenched administrative networks. Many officers such as Shaleen Kabra (1992 batch), Dheeraj Gupta (1993 batch), Navin Choudhary (1994 batch), Ashwani Kumar (1992 batch), and Ashish Chandra Verma (1994 batch) are senior to Sajjan Yadav. Two others, Shailendra Kumar and Anil Kumar Singh, are batchmates. This raises awkwardness about how the new, official, and formal command structure will translate into unquestioned authority.
The timing is crucial. Before the new chief secretary could settle in, lieutenant governor Manoj Sinha ordered a large-scale bureaucratic reshuffle. For example, Chandraker Bharti was given an additional charge of revenue, M. Raju was assigned estates, Saugat Biswas got an additional charge of Jal Shakti, Rehana Batul was moved to tribal affairs, and Avny Lavasa was handed extra responsibility. The situation becomes more complex and delicate due to inherent politics. Consider the fact that Dheeraj Gupta is additional chief secretary to chief minister Omar Abdullah. Hence, Sajjan Yadav, Jammu and Kashmir’s chief secretary, will need to coordinate between the political and bureaucratic establishments, i.e., between the offices of the chief minister and lieutenant governor. Under the framework for Union Territories, lieutenant governor Manoj Sinha retains significant authority over police, public order, and specified administrative issues. This leaves Sajjan Yadav in a tricky position, or at the intersection of competing power centres. The future is uncertain. Will senior bureaucrats listen to the new chief secretary, who will need to balance his feet between two boats?
The writer is a senior journalist and alumnus of the Delhi School of Economics. He is the editor of gfiles, India’s first magazine on civil services and governance. @AnilTyagilive.
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