TEHRAN – The European Union has placed Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) on its list of “terrorist organizations,” a move driven not by objective realities on the ground but by Western political tendencies. This comes despite the IRGC’s central role in defeating ISIS and confronting terrorist groups in the region—a reality that exposes the West’s double standards in defining terrorism.
In the final days of January 2026, EU foreign ministers meeting in Brussels decided to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization, placing it alongside groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. This decision, adopted unanimously by all 27 EU member states, includes asset freezes, travel bans, and restrictions on financial cooperation with IRGC members. European officials have justified the move as a response to what they describe as the “violent suppression of domestic protests” in Iran.
However, this decision is not based on an objective security assessment of the IRGC’s actual role in the region. Rather, it rests largely on political assumptions and Western human rights pressures. Recent protests in Iran and the response of security forces have been used as a pretext for this political step, while other underlying factors behind the decision deserve closer examination.
One of the most important facts overlooked in the EU’s current portrayal of the IRGC is the operational role of the IRGC and its Quds Force in combating the terrorist group ISIS in Iraq and Syria. After seizing large parts of both countries in 2014, ISIS posed a direct threat to Iran’s national security and that of its neighbors.
At the official invitation of the governments of Iraq and Syria, the IRGC and its Quds Force unit under the leadership of Lt. Gen. Qassem Soleimani entered the battlefield. Through a strategy of regional defense and in cooperation with popular forces and official armies, they succeeded in defeating ISIS across large parts of both countries.
By training and equipping the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) in Iraq and the National Defense Forces in Syria, the Quds Force helped form what became known as the “Axis of Resistance.” This coordination ultimately led to the liberation of cities such as Ramadi, Tikrit, Fallujah, and Deir ez-Zor—areas that had previously been under ISIS control.
In addition, the IRGC’s missile and drone operations against ISIS targets in Syria from 2017 onward played a clear role in degrading the group’s operational capabilities. Notably, long-range missile strikes launched from inside Iran against ISIS bases in Deir ez-Zor demonstrated Iran’s determination and operational capacity in confronting international terrorism.
How did ISIS become a regional threat, and why did Iran intervene?
In 2014, ISIS captured Mosul—the second-largest city in Iraq after Baghdad—becoming a symbol of the security crisis in West Asia. Through unprecedented violence against civilians and government officials, the group spread fear and instability across the region.
Iran viewed its military involvement and support for the governments of Iraq and Syria not as aggression or foreign interference, but as a legitimate act of regional self-defense. The collapse of official governments and the domination of ISIS would have posed a direct threat to Iran’s own security. Meanwhile, the presence of the United States and Western countries in Iraq and Syria was often driven by interest-based considerations and, in many cases, failed to establish lasting stability, instead paving the way for further complexities.
By contrast, the IRGC and the Quds Force, working directly with host governments, played a decisive role in defeating ISIS—an effort that contributed significantly to regional security and prevented a dangerous security vacuum.
In designating the IRGC as a “terrorist organization,” Western actors—particularly the European Union—claim to rely on established criteria for defining terrorism. Yet the West itself applies inconsistent and often contradictory definitions. Previously, the United States, Canada, and Australia had already designated the IRGC as a terrorist entity.
The main criticism of this approach is that the definition of terrorism should not be contingent upon political interests or hostility toward a particular country. Genuine terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda are defined by deliberate violence against civilians. The IRGC, by contrast, operated in Iraq and Syria within frameworks of cooperation with officially recognized governments and at their invitation. This fundamental distinction shows that the terrorism label now applied to the IRGC is more a political instrument of Western foreign policy than a coherent and objective security definition.
The European Union and Western states have repeatedly demonstrated clear double standards in their foreign policies. This hypocrisy is evident in their handling of domestic protests: in countries such as France, Germany, and the United States, police forces have at times confronted popular protests with force and violence, yet none of these systems are labeled “terrorist,” even when such actions have resulted in civilian deaths.
Conversely, when a country like Iran intervenes—based on security needs and official invitations—to combat global terrorism, it is branded a “terrorist” actor. This blatant contradiction in defining security and terrorism reveals that Western criteria are neither principled nor consistent, but rather tools of political pressure and sanctions.
Regional and international consequences of Europe’s decision
The EU’s decision to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization goes beyond symbolism and carries serious consequences.
First, it has intensified political tensions between Iran and Europe and triggered retaliatory responses, including Iran’s parliament designating European military forces as terrorist groups.
Second, the move may pave the way for further restrictions on trade, military, and cultural relations between Iran and European countries. At the same time, it could strengthen resistance-oriented discourse within Iran and the region against Western political pressure.
Third, the decision risks further rupturing diplomatic and security interactions. Iran has emphasized that the EU’s move is political, instrumental, and contrary to regional interests, warning that it could lead to dangerous political—and even security—consequences.
An objective assessment of the IRGC’s regional performance shows that it has not functioned as an independent terrorist or destabilizing force. Rather, it has served as a regional strategic defense instrument, playing a decisive role—through cooperation with the governments of Iraq and Syria—in combating terrorist groups such as ISIS. The leadership of the Quds Force and popular mobilization units in liberating ISIS-occupied areas stands as clear evidence of this reality.
In contrast, the Western definition of terrorism is often shaped by political considerations, selective human rights narratives, and geopolitical interests, rather than a fixed and objective framework. The label now applied to the IRGC by the European Union symbolizes this double standard in international politics—where security and justice are subordinated to self-interest rather than upheld as universal principles.
Ultimately, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, through its prominent role in fighting ISIS, supporting legitimate regional governments, and safeguarding Iran’s national security, represents a force with defensive and security-oriented objectives—not a “terrorist organization” in the concrete and objective sense applicable to groups like ISIS. The EU’s decision reflects political competition more than on-the-ground realities and highlights the West’s inconsistent standards in defining terrorism and security.
Disclaimer : This story is auto aggregated by a computer programme and has not been created or edited by DOWNTHENEWS. Publisher: tehrantimes.com
