The resumption of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah has surprised few who have been watching closely. The question was never whether conflict would return, only when. The arrangements that followed the November 27, 2024 ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel were widely understood to be temporary and structurally weak, leaving the underlying dynamics of confrontation largely untouched.
The ceasefire agreement, brokered by the United States and France, formally aimed to end active hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. In practice, however, the agreement never truly halted the conflict. Israeli forces maintained a presence in Lebanese territory, and military strikes against Lebanon continued on an almost daily basis. The agreement itself contained a significant ambiguity: It granted the Israeli military the ability to conduct operations whenever it perceived a potential threat to its security.
This clause introduced a fundamental imbalance. The monitoring mechanism, chaired by the US and including France, with the participation of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the Israeli military and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), was tasked with overseeing the agreement but lacked the authority to independently verify whether the threats cited by Israel were real or whether the locations targeted were indeed Hezbollah positions. Even more critically, the mechanism did not establish a clear process for verifying or adjudicating violations of the agreement. As a result, accountability remained elusive from the outset.
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The only international actor systematically documenting violations was UNIFIL, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701. According to UNIFIL records, between November 27, 2024 and the end of February 2026, more than 10,000 Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace and 1,400 military activities were recorded inside Lebanese territory. These incidents resulted in approximately 400 deaths and more than 1,100 injuries in Lebanon.
The monitoring mechanism itself collapsed with the resumption of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel after the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran. During its last, and probably final, meeting at the end of February, Israeli representatives did not attend, marking the end of the framework intended to supervise the ceasefire arrangements.
Meanwhile, Israeli forces still maintain control of five positions inside Lebanese territory near the villages of Labbouneh, Marwahin, Aitaroun, Hula and Sarada, in addition to establishing two buffer zones. According to the terms of the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, Israeli forces were expected to withdraw from these locations to allow the deployment of the LAF, but this transition never materialised.
During this period, UNIFIL worked with the LAF to facilitate the redeployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon, with several positions transferred back under Lebanese state control. However, continued Israeli strikes and military presence prevented the LAF from fully re-establishing authority in the south and restoring legitimate government institutions across the area.
The renewed conflict that erupted on March 2, 2026 appears even more asymmetric, unpredictable and violent than the previous confrontation. One major reason is the absence of any active diplomatic mediation capable of containing escalation. Unlike earlier phases of the conflict, when international diplomacy, however limited, attempted to prevent full-scale war, this new round has unfolded in a relative diplomatic vacuum.
Since the beginning of the broader confrontation in 2023, Israeli political and military leaders have repeatedly stated their intention to create security buffer zones north of the Blue Line that would be largely free of civilian presence. The pattern of attacks observed since late 2024 suggests a sustained effort to produce precisely such a reality on the ground. The scale of destruction in southern Lebanon supports this interpretation, with many villages near the Blue Line suffering extensive damage and several communities almost destroyed. Notably, much of this destruction occurred after the November 27 ceasefire, at a time when much of the civilian population had already been evacuated and Hezbollah attacks towards Israel had ceased.
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Attempts to restore local governance and services in the affected villages have faced immediate setbacks. Whenever local authorities tried to re-establish an administrative presence using temporary facilities such as prefabricated buildings or containers, those structures were frequently attacked. These attacks have prevented the return of civilian life and the re-establishment of local institutions.
Recent reports indicate the presence of Israeli forces in additional southern Lebanese villages, including Ramyah, Yaroun, Hula, Kafr Kela, Khiam, Kfar Shouba, Aitaroun and Markaba. If confirmed, this would represent a further extension of Israeli operational presence inside Lebanese territory, with no withdrawal timeline in sight.
These developments place significant strain on international law, particularly the principles of sovereignty and civilian protection. Yet the response from the international community has been strikingly muted. Diplomatic initiatives capable of mediating the conflict have so far failed to materialise.
The situation was further exacerbated by a controversial decision adopted by the UNSC on August 31, 2025, largely driven by the US administration during the annual debate on renewing the mission’s mandate.
The new resolution granted the peacekeeping force its last renewal, requesting a cessation of operations by the end of 2026 and final closure by 2027. Should this decision remain in effect, southern Lebanon could soon find itself without any international presence capable of monitoring events, supporting civilians and assisting the LAF in their redeployment.
The implications of such an absence are profound, and the risk of miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation would significantly increase.
The alleged use of white phosphorus along the Blue Line, coupled with repeated spraying of chemical pesticides reportedly aimed at preventing farmers from replanting their crops, suggests a deliberate effort to keep the area devoid of population and civilian infrastructure. These practices reinforce the depopulation of the border zone while further undermining the already severely damaged agricultural economy of southern Lebanon, with potentially long-term socioeconomic consequences.
Compared with the 2023–2024 conflict, the current hostilities have also expanded geographically. Air raids and attacks are now occurring across a broader range of locations in Lebanon, including areas previously considered relatively safe. This widening scope has heightened public anxiety and may destabilise Lebanon’s already fragile political balance.
Lebanon’s domestic situation remains extremely delicate. Continued military pressure risks shifting political alliances, weakening state institutions and further undermining Lebanese security forces.
For many Lebanese citizens, the expanding pattern of attacks is reviving memories of past periods of civil unrest and internal instability. Such dynamics may serve Israeli strategic interests by further weakening Lebanon internally.
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The resumption of Hezbollah attacks against Israel, reportedly following the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, may also reflect the dynamics of what the group perceives as an existential confrontation shaped in part by ideological imperatives. Hezbollah has long portrayed itself as a pillar of the “axis of resistance”, and continued engagement against Israel reinforces this identity.
At the same time, Hezbollah faces an internal political challenge. Within Lebanon’s evolving political landscape, the organisation has sought to reaffirm its relevance. In this context, renewed military activity can serve as a means of demonstrating that armed resistance remains necessary.
The LAF had, in recent months, attempted to reclaim areas in southern Lebanon, doing so with considerable determination despite limited resources. Yet these efforts were never matched by the level of international support that had been promised. A weakened and fragmented international community, often constrained by geopolitical alignments and the dominance of US and Israeli strategic priorities, proved unable to deliver sustained backing.
The latest developments have now pushed Israel towards preparing for the possibility of a ground invasion of Lebanon. Such an operation would follow a long historical pattern of Israeli military interventions in the country, including those in 1978, 1982, 2006 and, most recently, 2024.
If a ground offensive were to materialise, the consequences for Lebanon and regional stability could be severe. The current trajectory suggests a dangerous convergence of military escalation, institutional fragility and diplomatic paralysis. Without renewed international engagement and credible mediation, the Israel-Lebanon frontier risks sliding into another prolonged and devastating phase of conflict.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
Disclaimer : This story is auto aggregated by a computer programme and has not been created or edited by DOWNTHENEWS. Publisher: aljazeera.com
