How Charles Leclerc’s Chinese GP sprint qualifying issue highlights how complex the power units are

March 13, 2026

As is normal at the start of a technical rules cycle, one key aspect has to be taken into account: the new power units are incredibly complex and the strategies for using them are not straightforward. Experience is built over time, and even during a race weekend variables can emerge that change the overall picture and provide a different perspective.

That is also what happened to Charles Leclerc in sprint qualifying for the Chinese Grand Prix: in his final attempt in SQ3, what seemed like a lap good enough to put him in the fight for third position suddenly turned into a missed opportunity. On the long 1.2km back straight, the Monegasque found himself without energy earlier than his rivals, losing those tenths of a second that cost him the chance to fight for the second row.

But why is the problem experienced by the Monegasque so interesting? Because it captures all the reasons why, even for the teams, these power units currently remain extremely complex and developing models for them is incredibly difficult. It only takes changing a few parameters during the lap to influence energy management.

At the end of Australian GP qualifying last weekend, the Ferrari driver had explained that the result – as well as the gap to Mercedes – had also been affected by an issue related to hybrid management, configured with incorrect parameters, in a way similar to what had happened to him in Q2. In that case, however, returning to the pits had allowed everything to be reset and certain values corrected. Here, that possibility did not exist given it was his final SQ3 lap.

Like the previous engine rules era, systems are still operating on the power units today that adapt energy management depending on circumstances such as grip conditions, the tyres and how the lap is driven. The point is that, whereas until last year this aspect had less impact, energy management now has a much greater influence and every variation has a bigger effect, especially in qualifying where everything is pushed to the extreme compared with the race.

Without the support of the MGU-H and with an MGU-K effectively tripled in terms of power output, understanding where and how to use energy – as well as where to recover it – has become fundamental in terms of optimising lap time, and an incorrect strategy can cost several tenths. This is why Leclerc’s case is interesting, because it highlights how the power unit also reacted to certain driving inputs.

Charles Leclerc, Ferrari

Photo by: Sam Bloxham / LAT Images via Getty Images

If you look at the Monegasque’s two laps in Q3, differences emerge which at first glance might seem minimal but which in reality carry considerable weight. In the first attempt of the final segment, Leclerc approached Turn 8 and the acceleration zone leading to the braking for Turn 11 differently, not only compared with the final lap of SQ3, but also compared with SQ2.

The differences are particularly clear when comparing the two attempts: for example, between Turns 8 and 9 – one of the most delicate sections from an energy-management perspective, given that it is one of the areas where the FIA had allowed a different power reduction compared with the rest of the lap – Leclerc chose a different approach, also using a different gear.

In the first attempt in SQ3 he went as low as fourth gear, while in the second push lap he chose fifth, with an obvious difference in engine revs. This different interpretation of that section is directly reflected in the cornering speeds, which were around 15kph higher in the second attempt.

Likewise, on the acceleration before Turn 11 a rather particular behaviour also emerges. In the first attempt the power unit begins cutting energy well in advance, likely entering super clipping very early, considering that this represents one of the most effective recharge points on the lap. It is interesting to note, however, that a difference in approach also appears here.

While in the first attempt Leclerc kept sixth gear with the engine revs high, during the second push he instead shifted up to seventh, with a difference of around 17kph between the two laps. Leclerc therefore found himself with more energy available to use on the long straight, to the point that in the first attempt he not only reached a peak speed that was 9kph higher, but also did so later. This means that more energy was deployed along the acceleration phase, shifting the derating phase further down the straight.

Among the frontrunning drivers, Leclerc seemed to be the one who experimented with the most noticeable variation in energy management between SQ2 and the first push in SQ3. The others, by contrast, maintained a much more consistent strategy between the different segments. It is therefore not surprising that, at the end of the first attempt, Leclerc immediately pointed out over the radio how negative the lap had been, with his engineer explaining that two of the six tenths he was losing to Hamilton in the second sector came from Turn 8.

Lewis Hamilton, Ferrari

Photo by: Guido De Bortoli / LAT Images via Getty Images

Clearly the system learns from what has happened previously and, since it was a sprint weekend, there was no time to return to the pits and recalibrate certain parameters. Looking at the two best laps from Leclerc and Hamilton, some interesting elements emerge. In the section between Turn 7 and Turn 8, Hamilton anticipates the downshift, keeps the engine speed high and is more careful in applying the throttle before entering Turn 9, saving energy.

Considering that Hamilton had reached a lower peak speed before Turn 6, Leclerc found himself in a situation where the system readapted the usage strategy, cutting energy earlier on the long straight. However, rather than being something linked only to the final attempt, the differences in deployment had actually begun earlier, making the Monegasque’s SQ3 extremely complex to manage and far from straightforward in terms of the power unit’s response.