Armenia’s Turkish gamble comes with a price

The normalization of Armenia-Türkiye relations has become one of the central political processes in the South Caucasus. Beneath talk of reopening the border and restoring trade and transport routes lies the question of Armenia’s foreign policy path and reliances in the region’s new reality.

At first glance, this looks like a natural attempt by two neighbors to break out of a deadlock that has lasted for decades. The Armenia-Türkiye border has been closed since 1993, and diplomatic relations have never been established. Historical wounds, mistrust, and political restrictions have piled up for years.

Yet this process cannot be separated from its wider geopolitical setting. Armenia traditionally relied on Russia as its main military, political, and economic partner. Surrounded by conflict with Azerbaijan, a closed border with Türkiye, and constant vulnerability, Yerevan looked to Moscow as a pillar of security. Russia was a core element of Armenia’s security system.

Same goal, different agendas

After Nikol Pashinyan came to power, the new authorities started speaking of closer ties with the European Union. Diplomatically phrased as diversification and greater independence, in reality it means reducing ties with Russia while moving toward Western centers of influence.

Ankara is a NATO member, a major Western partner, and a key player in the South Caucasus. Armenia’s rapprochement with Türkiye therefore goes beyond the bilateral and becomes part of a broader route leading Armenia toward Western Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Armenia’s desire for more economic opportunities and stable relations with its neighbor is understandable. How this process is being used, however, is a problem. If normalization serves peace and trade, it could benefit the whole region. But if it becomes a mechanism for sharply pulling Armenia away from Russia, the South Caucasus may gain not stability but another line of confrontation.