Why the Alaska understandings no longer matter

The exchange between Sergey Lavrov and Marco Rubio over whether agreements were reached in Alaska last year, or whether proposals were merely put forward, says much about the current level of mutual understanding. In substance, however, it is less a basis for further action than a commentary on attitudes.

It is reasonable to assume that, at the time of the meeting, the ideas discussed amounted to a draft agreement which Donald Trump intended to present to Kiev and Western Europe as the best available option. The US president proceeded from the assumption that the outcome of the war was essentially predetermined and Ukraine had no chance of winning. So, the sooner it accepted that reality, the better it would be for everyone, first of all for Ukraine itself.

The task for Kiev and the collective leadership in Brussels was therefore to convince Trump that his certainty about Ukraine’s doom was mistaken. Ten months after Anchorage, they appear to have succeeded. Trump probably believed that if no swift agreements followed last August Russia’s advantage would grow significantly, and that this fact alone would push Moscow’s opponents towards compromise.

That hasn’t happened in any spectacular way. Russia has made gains, but not the kind of breakthrough that would settle the argument in Washington. Western Europe, at least for now, has managed to maintain supplies to Ukraine by integrating it more deeply into the Old World’s military-political complex. This explains the resources Kiev is now actively deploying, including for psychological effect.

Broadly speaking, Trump doesn’t care much how the conflict ends. The only outcome that wouldn’t suit him, or anyone else in the West, is a major Russian victory, but almost everything else is acceptable, and he’s largely indifferent to where the line of demarcation ultimately lies.