TEHRAN – Following the sixth round of face-to-face talks between the Lebanese and Israeli governments, critics continue to question the Lebanese authorities’ approach to issues of occupation and sovereignty.
The two-day, U.S.-mediated direct negotiations were held at the U.S. Embassy in the Italian capital Rome. According to reports citing unnamed U.S. officials, the two sides continued discussions on proposed so-called “pilot zones” in two areas of southern Lebanon.
Ahead of the talks, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, who is due to visit Washington on July 21, said he had instructed the Lebanese delegation “to demand the immediate withdrawal of Israeli (occupation) forces from two pilot zones before any further discussions.”
However, no official statements were issued by either side following the latest round of negotiations.
Under a U.S.-brokered “framework agreement” reached on June 26, Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) are to withdraw from large areas of southern Lebanon they currently occupy, and transfer control to the Lebanese army. The Lebanese army would then clear them of any Hezbollah presence and disarm the Lebanese resistance movement.
The agreement envisioned an initial phase centered on so-called “pilot zones”. Nobody has yet disclosed which areas of southern Lebanon would be designated as the proposed “pilot zones”. Lebanese officials previously said the plan would encompass the towns of Froun, Ghandouriyeh, and Zawtar.
That drew widespread condemnation in Lebanon because the IOF is not currently occupying most of the areas designated under this plan, raising questions about the Lebanese government’s approach to securing an IOF withdrawal.
Making matters worse, Israeli officials have categorically stated in public that the regime has no intention of ending its occupation of southern Lebanon, including under the proposed “pilot zones” arrangement.
The provisions of the “framework agreement” signed by the Lebanese authorities now clearly resemble the terms of a surrender document more than an agreement between two equal parties. Only defeated states accept the continued presence of an occupying force, allow its position to be entrenched, and refrain from explicitly demanding its withdrawal in a document bearing their own signature.
Added to this is a feature that is almost unique to the Lebanese case: a commitment to halt all forms of legal action aimed at holding an enemy accountable for war crimes that rose to the level of genocide and met the criteria for urban, cultural, and environmental genocide.
Despite this, those defending the agreement rely on contradictory arguments. On the one hand, they insist that what they have done is a major and historic decision taken by the “state” in the interest of preserving sovereignty, restoring its authority, and exercising its exclusive right to declare war and peace.
On the other hand, they respond to widespread criticism of the agreement by claiming that it was an inevitable result of the balance of power created by the most recent Israeli regime aggression. This, they argue, made it impossible to secure anything better than what the agreement contains.
In doing so, they implicitly acknowledge that the agreement suffers from significant flaws and imbalances, extending even to the relinquishment of key elements of sovereignty.
In either case, this line of argument is riddled with misconceptions and misleading claims. Not every negotiation conducted by the “state” is evidence of its strength, especially when the “state” stays silent and takes no action in the face of occupation and aggression.
Attempting to compensate for this reality by insisting on portraying it as something other than what it is does not build a state. Instead, it undermines public confidence in both the state and the rhetoric promoting that image, and erodes its authority rather than strengthening it.
It would have been more appropriate for Lebanon’s President and Prime Minister, who have positioned themselves at the forefront of confronting Hezbollah, to acknowledge Lebanon’s actual condition, identify its points of weakness, and launch a serious national dialogue to address them.
They should have worked toward an agreement on a defensive strategy that draws on Lebanon’s existing strengths rather than persisting with rhetoric that accomplishes nothing and, naturally, does not build a state.
Presenting the agreement as the unavoidable outcome of the “war’s consequences” is likewise based on numerous misconceptions.
Hezbollah’s steadfastness on the battlefield, the heavy losses it inflicted on the IOF while wearing it down over four months, together with the regional development represented by the failure of the United States and the Zionist regime to achieve their objectives in the illegal war against Iran, all contributed to reshaping the strategic landscape.
Likewise, Iran’s declaration that any future agreement with the United States must end hostilities on all fronts, in particular Lebanon, cannot be overlooked when assessing the context in which the “framework agreement” was reached. Tehran made the end of the aggression on Lebanon, the preservation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the withdrawal of occupying forces fundamental conditions that must be met before the start of negotiations and the signing of any deal.
Taken together, these factors placed the Lebanese negotiators in a position where rejecting an agreement that was closer to an instrument of surrender than to a balanced political settlement was entirely possible.
Surrender is not simply the outcome of battlefield developments. It is a political, strategic, and legal decision shaped by multiple factors and adopted in response to specific circumstances.
For example, a decisive military defeat that leaves the armed forces incapable of continuing the fight. This does not apply to Lebanon. Hezbollah continued resisting and confronting the aggression, inflicting severe losses on the IOF, as acknowledged by Israeli officials themselves.
Israeli officials also stated that the regime had failed to achieve its declared objectives, whether eliminating Hezbollah or restoring security to the northern settlements.
The occupation of the Lebanese capital, Beirut, also never occurred and remained far beyond reach. In 1982, the regime was able to occupy Beirut in less than a week, whereas Hezbollah held out for over four months in southern Lebanon, continued wearing down and inflicting pain on the IOF, and prevented it from achieving the ground advance it had planned.
Critics further argue that the Lebanese negotiating performance was marked by poor political and diplomatic competence. The conduct of officials who insisted on pursuing direct negotiations, coupled with their repeated acceptance of proposals presented by Washington at the conclusion of each negotiating round, appeared less like genuine bargaining and more like the implementation of prior commitments.
It raised questions over whether the process was being guided by national interests. This course of action appears to rest on an effort to draw Lebanon into an American-Israeli alliance, an objective that Lebanon’s historical experience suggests is unattainable.
That experience has repeatedly demonstrated how difficult it is to impose strategic choices of this kind on a society governed by delicate and highly sensitive internal balances.
More troubling still is that persisting with this approach could push Lebanon toward another internal explosion, similar to those it experienced historically, and result in further weakening of the state and its institutions instead of strengthening them and consolidating stability.
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