The reported drone attack strike on a Naga insurgent camp at Homalin in Sagaing region of Myanmar on October 11, reportedly killing 36 militants, is a development of considerable significance for northeast India. The drone strikes followed by aerial bombardment are said to have destroyed the camp. The camp, located in the Somra tract of Myanmar (opposite Ukhrul district of Manipur), is said to be the base of the newly established NSCN-IM [Eastern Flank (EF)], a breakaway faction of NSCN-IM (which is in ceasefire with the Government of India since 1997). The camp is also said to have been harbouring elements of Ulfa(I) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA), militant factions of Assam and Manipur, respectively. The spearheads of the NSCN-IM(EF) are said to be Ikato Chisi Swu (son of the co-founder of NSCN-IM, Issac Chisi Swu), a Sumi Naga from Nagaland, besides Hansi Ramsan and Absalom Raman, both Tangkhul Nagas from Ukhrul, Manipur. Whether any of these leaders of NSCN-IM(EF) were in the camp at the time of the strikes, is unknown. What is for certain is that the strike is likely to have severely dented the capability of NSCN-IM(EF) as also the other militant groups that were taking shelter in this camp to strike Security Forces.
The NSCN-IM(EF), by officially breaking away from the parent NSCN-IM in July 2026, also automatically broke away from the ceasefire with GoI. Thereafter, it has indulged in multiple acts of violence. An Assam Rifles soldier was killed in an IED attack near Sukhovi in Nagaland on July 13 this year. Before that, on July 6, two Assam Rifles soldiers were killed in an ambush near Ukhrul in Manipur . Both acts are supposed to be the handiwork of NSCN-IM(EF). The now raging battle in Manipur between the Kukis and Nagas is also said to have considerable involvement of NSCN-IM(EF) as also NSCN-IM; both trying to showcase themselves as the custodians and saviours of the Naga cause. Both the groups have also increasingly spin-doctored narratives and aroused anti-security forces feelings in Ukhrul and Kamjong districts of Manipur. The Kuki militant factions, meanwhile, have armed themselves overtime, with the large availability of weapons in the war-ravaged fields of Myanmar.
It is worth recounting that during Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to India from May 30 to June 3, he explicitly assured India that Myanmar’s territory would not be permitted to be used against India’s security interests. The Homalin operation appears consistent with this undertaking. For decades, insurgent groups from Nagaland, Manipur and Assam have exploited Myanmar’s difficult terrain to maintain training camps, logistical facilities and sanctuaries. Taga earlier, and Homalin more recently, both in Sagaing region, represent the strategic depth these groups have sought beyond India’s borders.
The past year illustrates the continuing threat. On October 16, 2025, suspected NSCN- Khaplang-Yung Aung [NSCN(K-YA)] and Ulfa(I) militants attacked an Assam Rifles Camp in Changlang district of Arunachal Pradesh, injuring four soldiers. On January 26, 2026, NSCN(K-YA) claimed responsibility for another attack on an Assam Rifles position, also in Changlang. Fortunately, no casualties were reported in the second incident. More recently, on September 29, an Assam Rifles patrol near Nampong in Changlang was ambushed, killing Havildar Jankhokai Kuki and injuring four others. NSCN(K-YA) and the PLA, jointly claimed responsibility. The attack demonstrated the continuing operational links between Naga and Meitei insurgent formations. The two groups claimed that this attack was to warn India against the creation of the border fence on the Indo-Myanmar border. Although there is no evidence that all these attacks originated from Homalin, the importance of Myanmar-based sanctuaries cannot be overlooked.
There is an important historical precedent to the current strike at Homalin. In May 2019, the Myanmar Army destroyed and then occupied the NSCN(K) headquarters at Taga. Camps associated with NSCN(K), ULFA(I), and PLA were targeted. It was a body blow to these groups. Later, in May 2020, Myanmar handed over 22 insurgents arrested during the earlier operations at Taga. It demonstrated what sustained bilateral security cooperation could achieve. Further, most of the Indian insurgent groups in Myanmar have joined hands with the Peoples Defence Force (PDF) lately and are thus being targeted by the Myanmar Army.
In the present situation, the Indian Army and Assam Rifles continue to maintain operational pressure along the border, disrupting militant movement and logistical networks. In May 2026, Assam Rifles killed two suspected NSCN cadres during an intelligence-led operation in Changlang. Arrests, recoveries and surrenders have further weakened insurgent networks. The Homalin strike, if followed by sustained Myanmar operations, could now place additional pressure on their sanctuaries.
However, one strike cannot eliminate insurgency. Myanmar’s limited control over portions of its territory could enable militants to relocate. Sustained cooperation must, therefore, be accompanied by intelligence-sharing, surveillance, effective border management and protection of local civilian populations. The diplomatic implications are equally important. During their national-level meeting in July 2026, India and Myanmar agreed to strengthen intelligence-sharing and operational coordination against insurgency, arms smuggling and narcotics. The October 2026 defence cooperation meeting in Guwahati further emphasised training, capacity-building and mutual security. Homalin could provide additional momentum to this growing convergence.
For Myanmar, closer relations with India offer strategic alternatives to excessive dependence on China, without compromising its sovereignty. Homalin could, therefore, become more than an isolated military success. If Myanmar continues this pressure, and India complements it with effective security operations and political engagement, armed groups could find their remaining combat potential considerably diminished. Myanmar’s willingness to act against insurgent sanctuaries could ultimately prove as important for Northeast India’s security as any operation conducted within India’s own borders.
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