China is a strange country. It has the most sophisticated war gadgets, the largest number of ships and the latest technology for rockets and space warfare, but it has fewer and fewer generals. Who is going to lead the troops in case of a conflict? It is a valid question.
In the meantime, all sorts of rumours are floating around, most of which is fake news, though indicating the present climate in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Wanjun Xie, the New York-based chairman of China Democracy Party, an active student during the Tiananmen Square revolt in 1989, recently wrote: “It is reported that the announcement stating that Xi Jinping is no longer the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) has been issued to all military units at the brigade level and above throughout the entire army.”
A few days later, on September 17, Chairman Xi was seen in Beijing, when he met with representatives from various groups involved in organising the commemorations marking the 80th anniversary of the victory against the “Japanese aggression”.
But let’s go back a few weeks earlier.
On August 20, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and CMC chairman, landed at Lhasa’s Gongkar airport to celebrate 60 years of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). China watchers examined the composition of the large delegation accompanying Mr Xi from Beijing to decipher the visit.
Mr Xi was accompanied, among others, by Wang Huning, No. 4 in the party, Cai Qi, No. 5 and director of the General Office of the Central Committee, Li Ganjie, head of the United Front Work Department, and Gen. Zhang Shengmin, one of three remaining uniformed CMC members.
Gen Zhang Youxia, the CMC vice-chairman, did not turn up, probably because he and Mr Xi have lately not seen eye to eye. One can assume that it is the difference of perceptions between the two leaders which has fuelled most of the recent wild rumours.
But there was more to be decoded. Lt. Gen. Wang Haijiang, who since August 2021 has been commanding the Western Theatre Command, opposite India, was missing in action. Earlier, Gen. Wang had a long career in Tibet. Has he been purged? Also missing was Lt. Gen. Wang Kai, the commander of the Tibet Military District (TMD); and only the TMD’s political commissar, Lt. Gen. Yuan Honggang was seen with Mr Xi. These absences are intriguing.
Another surprise for the watchers during the gala reception in the evening was Gen. Zhao Zongqi, the artisan of the Doklam confrontation (2017) and the East Ladakh Chinese intrusions in 2020, posturing, seated in full uniform in the row behind the top leader. Gen. Zhao retired from the PLA in December 2020; he was then serving as commander of the Western Theatre Command. In the past, Gen. Zhao had created havoc in Sino-Indian relations. So, why was he invited? Probably to show India that the border issue is far from being completely settled, despite the recent high-level meetings.
A friend, closing following the developments in China, told me: “Don’t worry, we will get more information on the absentee generals on September 3, during the grand parade.”
It was not to be the case.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) published a piece entitled: “Why were China’s generals missing in action during the Victory Day parade?”
The Hong Kong publication explained: “When China held its first Victory Day military parade in 2015, more than 50 generals joined troops to march down Changan Avenue in central Beijing. The generals of all stripes led dozens of formations past the Tiananmen rostrum, saluting President Xi Jinping as the official announcer read out each commander’s name.”
Four years later, the same practice was followed. “The generals were also out in force for the National Day parade in 2019, giving observers a rare opportunity to see the PLA’s new generation of rising stars,” the SCMP said, and added: “[Such] events were also a valuable chance to learn who was in charge of each unit.”
While the names of 89 generals (including four full generals, two lieutenant-generals and 83 major-generals) leading 59 formations were announced for the September parade, none appeared on September 3.
Just before the start of the CPC’s fourth plenum on October 20, Senior Col. Zhang Xiaogang, spokesperson for China’s defence ministry, confirmed the dramatic changes: “With the approval of the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, the CMC’s Discipline Inspection Commission and Supervisory Commission have opened formal investigations into nine senior military officials.”
It included Politburo member and CMC vice-chairman He Weidong and CMC member and director of the political work department, Miao Hua. According to the spokesperson: “Investigations revealed that all nine officials had seriously violated Party discipline and were suspected of committing major duty-related crimes involving extremely large sums of money.”
What is strange is that all nine had been promoted to three-star-generals by Xi Jinping himself, often jumping rank over senior generals.
More intriguingly, He Weidong, Miao Hua and Lin Xiangyang had previously served in the 31st Group Army, Mr Xi’s former power base in Fujian. Why would Mr Xi sack his own men? Has he lost control over the PLA?
It is a valid question, but still remains unanswered.
But this does not tell us if China can fight battles, in Taiwan or elsewhere, with revolving generals, who have a constant sword hanging over their heads.
Earlier this year, Joel Wuthnow, a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the US National Defence University, wrote an essay “Can Xi Jinping Control the PLA?” for the publication China Leadership Monitor.
While presuming that Xi Jinping is in control of the PLA, he noted: “The recent purges of senior Chinese military officers have renewed the question of how firmly in charge of the People’s Liberation Army is Xi Jinping.”
Mr Wuthnow’ conclusions were: “[Xi] has largely preserved a tradition of PLA autonomy relative to the party leadership, both to consolidate his own power… and to focus on its war-fighting missions… The scope of the dismissals has remained narrow.”
They may be relatively narrow, but they are significant; indeed, can an Army fight with a constant sword above the heads of its senior officers?
Will the energy and time of the generals be spent to preserve their future (and their heads) or can they seriously do war preparation planning. The answer seems obvious that they cannot.
Claude Arpi is Distinguished Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence (Delhi), and writes on India, China, Tibet and Indo-French relations
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