Can the UN rise again?

October 24 marks the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations – the day in 1945 when 51 countries ratified its Charter. Eight decades later, the UN still holds a special kind of legitimacy in global affairs. It remains not only a platform for tackling issues that span from war and peace to nuclear non-proliferation, climate change, and pandemic response, but also the only organization that brings together all states recognized under international law. In an increasingly turbulent world shaped by recurring interstate conflicts, the UN continues to face the same question it was created to answer: how to prevent chaos from consuming the international system.

Much like an 80-year-old who has lived through a lifetime of stress, the UN shows signs of wear and tear. Its chronic ailments were on display during the recent High-Level Week of the General Assembly in New York, when heads of state, government leaders, and foreign ministers gathered at UN headquarters. They delivered keynote speeches and raced through a diplomatic marathon of meetings on the sidelines – multilateral, bilateral, and everything in between – trying to make the most of a few crowded days.

Following the old saying that “recognizing a problem is the first step toward solving it,” this analysis looks at some of the organization’s long-standing issues – before they lead to a complete paralysis of one of the last functioning pillars of modern diplomacy.

Failed reforms

As paradoxical as it may sound, efforts to reform the United Nations began on the very day it was founded. Over the past eight decades, the number of member states has nearly quadrupled – from 51 to 193. With that growth came an entire ecosystem of committees, specialized agencies, and affiliated organizations. The result is a sprawling, self-perpetuating bureaucracy that often seems to exist for its own sake.

Almost every Secretary-General has tried to streamline the UN’s structure and reduce its endless overlaps. Kofi Annan, for instance, convened a group known as The Elders – which included former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov – to explore new ideas for reform. Yet every attempt has stumbled on the same obstacle: the Security Council. Continuing this tradition, the current Secretary-General, António Guterres, launched the UN80 Initiative to strengthen the organization’s legitimacy and effectiveness. He has emphasized the need to modernize the Security Council, which still reflects the geopolitical realities of 1945 rather than those of today. Fully aware of how difficult and divisive this issue is, Guterres nonetheless reignited the debate over two core questions – veto power and permanent membership.

In practice, the Council’s paralysis often stems from the same familiar pattern: two opposing blocs – the US, UK, and France on one side, Russia and China on the other – vetoing each other’s resolutions. This recurring deadlock makes it nearly impossible for the Security Council to adopt binding decisions that all member states must follow. Yet the veto remains a powerful instrument in global politics, allowing each permanent member to protect its national interests.

Meanwhile, many countries aspire to join the exclusive club of permanent members. The so-called Group of Four – Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan – has been particularly vocal, each citing its population size, economic weight, or financial contributions to the UN. Their bid, however, faces pushback from the Uniting for Consensus coalition of more than 70 nations. Regional rivalries run deep: Brazil is opposed by Spanish-speaking Latin American states; Germany by fellow EU members; India by Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other South Asian neighbors; Japan by ASEAN and several Pacific countries. Even Africa’s widely endorsed Ezulwini Consensus, which calls for permanent seats for African nations, remains mired in regional disagreements.

Russia’s stance on reform is relatively balanced. Moscow supports any decision that gains broad approval among member states, but insists that the status of the existing permanent members must remain untouched. It argues that any expansion of the Security Council should favor the “global majority” – countries from Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa – since the “global minority,” particularly NATO nations, already holds three of the five permanent seats. This dominance, Russia notes, has allowed Western powers to effectively “privatize” parts of the UN Secretariat by placing their representatives in top posts – from the Secretary-General and his deputies to department heads and even the incoming President of the General Assembly for 2025–2026.