Checkmate in Kabul? India’s New Move to Corner Pakistan

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Afghanistan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to India has now transformed the India–Taliban relationship from secret discussions to open engagement.


Published date india.com
Published: October 19, 2025 10:12 PM IST

Checkmate in Kabul? India's New Move to Corner Pakistan
Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi was on a six-day visit to India which concluded on October 16. (File)

India-Afghanistan relations: India’s relationship with Afghanistan is entering a new and fascinating chapter. The six-day visit of Afghan Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to New Delhi, which ended on October 16, is more than a diplomatic event—it marks India’s quiet but confident return to Afghanistan’s political map. For a country that once supported liberal governments and spoke openly about democracy, women’s rights, and inclusivity in Kabul, today’s approach is far more practical and strategic.

This shift shows that India is now ready to talk to whoever controls Afghanistan, as long as Indian interests are respected. The visit, followed by a joint India-Taliban statement, made it clear that New Delhi has dropped its earlier moralistic tone and is now taking a realist path—focused on national security, trade routes, and regional balance, not on internal Afghan politics.

For decades, Afghanistan has been a playground for India–Pakistan rivalry. Since the Cold War, both nations have treated the rugged Afghan terrain as a stage for influence. India supported the Western-backed, democratic governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, while Pakistan sponsored and sheltered the Taliban. When the Taliban took over Kabul in August 2021, India’s presence virtually disappeared. Embassies shut down, Indian aid workers evacuated, and relations fell silent. But India never forgot the importance of Afghanistan—both as a friend and as a route connecting India to Central Asia.

India’s re-engagement has been a carefully planned journey. It started with sending a small technical team to Kabul in 2022, one year after the embassy’s closure. This was presented as a purely humanitarian step—to monitor aid and relief work—but it opened the door to renewed contact. By late 2023, India quietly allowed the Taliban to appoint an envoy and reopened its consulates in Mumbai and Hyderabad. Then came quiet talks in Dubai and Doha between Indian officials and Taliban leaders. The January meeting between Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai was the moment India decided that silent diplomacy was no longer enough. The next step was inevitable—direct political talks in New Delhi.

Muttaqi’s visit to India has now transformed the India–Taliban relationship from secret discussions to open engagement. India’s decision to upgrade its Kabul office into a full embassy is a clear signal that the two sides are now entering a formal partnership. The joint statement released on October 10 emphasized humanitarian cooperation, new investment plans, and security commitments. The Taliban’s promise that Afghanistan’s soil will not be used by terrorists against India is a significant breakthrough, even if it still needs to be tested in action.

This growing closeness carries deep symbolism. By giving an official platform to the Taliban foreign minister, India has in effect accepted the reality of the current regime in Kabul—even if it stops short of formal recognition. For New Delhi, the priority now is stability on its western borders, safety for its development projects, and access to Central Asia for trade.

India’s “Connect Central Asia” policy depends heavily on peace and connectivity through Afghanistan. The Central Asian nations—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—are rich in oil, gas, and minerals. To reach them efficiently, India needs a stable Afghanistan. The Chabahar Port, built by India in Iran, plays a crucial role in this new strategy. It gives India direct trade access to Afghanistan and beyond, cutting Pakistan completely out of the equation.

The biggest geopolitical message of India’s new move is aimed at Pakistan. For years, Islamabad believed that its deep ties with the Taliban gave it a permanent advantage in Afghanistan. But the ground reality is shifting quickly. The Taliban’s relations with Pakistan have worsened due to border clashes along the Durand Line and Pakistan’s expectation that Kabul would act against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Taliban’s refusal to do so has strained ties. Meanwhile, the inclusion of phrases like condemnation of the Pahalgam terror attack in the joint India–Taliban statement shows a political message that directly contradicts Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir.

For Pakistan’s security establishment, this new alignment is worrying. A friendly relationship between the Taliban and India challenges Islamabad’s idea of strategic depth and increases the risk of growing Pashtun nationalism along the border. Pakistan’s internal problems—frequent militant attacks, growing unrest in Balochistan, and economic instability—make it even harder for it to control the regional narrative.

For India, the benefits of this new Afghan outreach are clear. It gives India a diplomatic foothold back in Kabul, opens economic access to Central Asia, and helps contain Pakistan’s influence from two sides. It also strengthens India’s hand against China’s Belt and Road projects, especially the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

However, this policy also raises questions. India had once described its Afghanistan relationship as a “Strategic Partnership” built on democratic values and protection of all groups. The new joint statement with the Taliban makes no mention of women’s education, minority rights, or inclusive governance—issues India championed in the past. This may seem like a compromise of values, but in the current geopolitical context, it reflects a practical choice.

Afghanistan under the Taliban is not going to become a model democracy anytime soon. But India has decided that isolation helps no one. By engaging directly with the Taliban, New Delhi ensures that its projects, citizens, and long-term regional aims remain protected.

This is India’s bold Afghan reset—guided less by ideology and more by interest. It shows that diplomacy works best not with speeches, but with steady, strategic action. And this time, India is setting its own terms in the neighbourhood, not waiting for anyone else to draw the map.

(The author, Girish Linganna is an award-winning science communicator and a Defence, Aerospace & Geopolitical Analyst. He is the Managing Director of ADD Engineering Components India Pvt. Ltd., a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany.)


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