A disturbing pattern is emerging in Bangladesh’s evolving political landscape: overt hostility toward India is no longer confined to fringe rhetoric but is increasingly being deployed as a tool for political legitimacy and mass mobilization. All of this is happening right under the nose of interim leader Muhammad Yunus, who has not only failed to stop these remarks but also allowed attacks on Hindus to remain unchecked. Now, from student leaders to militant-linked actors, anti-India threats are now being articulated openly, publicly, and without fear of immediate political consequence—suggesting a deeper shift in the country’s power dynamics.
Recent statements by student politician Hasnat Abdullah capture this shift starkly. Threatening to “cut off the Seven Sisters” of India’s Northeast and offering sanctuary to anti-India groups, Abdullah’s remarks go far beyond protest politics. They reflect an emerging belief that confronting India—verbally or otherwise—is a shortcut to relevance and authority in the post–Sheikh Hasina political environment.
This trend has been reinforced by even more alarming developments on the ground. So-called militant leader Rashid Pradhan openly threatened the Indian High Commission, declaring, “We stopped here this time; next time, we will enter the Indian Embassy. Indian domination will not continue on Bengali soil.” Such language, delivered in public forums, marks a normalization of direct threats against diplomatic institutions—an act that violates international norms and signals institutional erosion.
Perhaps most revealing was the recent “long march” led by Musaddique, another figure reportedly linked to Chhatra Shibir politics. The march was explicitly aimed at attacking the Indian mission in Dhaka. Even after being stopped by police, Musaddique issued chilling warnings, “We will return. Not a single brick of this embassy will remain. Indians will not be allowed on Bangladeshi soil.” He went further, invoking economic coercion, claiming that if financial flows from Bangladesh stopped, “Indians will starve to death.” The fact that such threats were issued openly, in the presence of law enforcement, underscores the confidence these actors now possess.
This confidence has not gone unnoticed in New Delhi. Earlier this week, India’s Ministry of External Affairs summoned Bangladesh High Commissioner Riaz Hamidullah to convey serious concerns about the deteriorating security situation in Bangladesh, particularly the activities of extremist elements targeting Indian diplomatic missions. According to the MEA, these groups have openly announced plans to create a security crisis around the Indian mission in Dhaka.
India firmly rejected what it described as a “false narrative” being pushed by extremist actors in relation to recent developments in Bangladesh. More significantly, New Delhi expressed concern that the Muhammad Yunus-led interim government has neither conducted a thorough investigation into these incidents nor shared credible evidence with India. This perceived inaction has added to apprehensions that the interim administration is either unwilling or unable to rein in radical elements.
In its statement, the MEA reiterated that India’s relationship with Bangladesh is rooted in the shared history of the 1971 Liberation War and has been strengthened through development partnerships and people-to-people ties. India also reaffirmed its consistent support for free, fair, inclusive, and credible elections in Bangladesh, conducted in a peaceful environment. Importantly, New Delhi called upon the interim government to fulfill its diplomatic obligations by ensuring the safety and security of Indian missions and personnel.
What makes the current moment particularly consequential is that anti-India rhetoric appears to be filling a political vacuum. With traditional power structures weakened and legitimacy contested, attacking India has become a unifying slogan—one that cuts across student politics, Islamist mobilization, and radical nationalism. In this new order, hostility toward India functions less as foreign policy positioning and more as a domestic credential.
The danger lies not only in deteriorating India-Bangladesh relations but also in the internal trajectory of Bangladeshi politics itself. When threats against diplomatic missions and neighboring states become normalized tools of political ascent, the line between populism and militancy blurs. If left unchecked, this trend could reshape Bangladesh’s political culture in ways that undermine regional stability, diplomatic norms, and its own democratic aspirations. What is unfolding is not merely a rhetorical escalation against India, but the emergence of a political ecosystem where attacking India is no longer optional—it is fast becoming a pathway to power.
Disclaimer : This story is auto aggregated by a computer programme and has not been created or edited by DOWNTHENEWS. Publisher: ZEE News
