Is Russia the key to ending the Iran war?

The Middle East has seen many crises that began as ‘limited’ operations and turned into open-ended wars.

The familiar pattern is not caused by miscalculation alone, but by geography and structure; once the first missiles fly, the region’s tightly interlinked security and economic systems pull neighboring states into the blast radius. What is happening around Iran today fits this logic with disturbing clarity. The US-Israeli strike campaign may have been conceived as a short, high-intensity effort, but the trajectory now points toward something far larger, because the conflict has already expanded beyond the original triangle and is steadily drawing in the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf.

In strategic terms, this expansion is not incidental. It follows a logic Tehran considers both necessary and, in its own framing, legitimate. Iran argues that once the US becomes a direct party to the operation – through strikes, intelligence support, basing, or force posture – it acquires the status of an active belligerent, and that US military infrastructure across the region therefore becomes a lawful target.

From that standpoint, the “battlefield” is not confined to Iranian airspace or Israeli territory; it extends to the regional lattice that enables American power projection, including bases, logistics nodes, command-and-control facilities, airfields, and the wider support ecosystem that keeps them functioning. In practice, the line between purely military and militarily-enabling assets can blur in moments of escalation, which is precisely why pressure radiates outward – toward transport corridors, port facilities, radar sites, and other strategic points that Tehran associates with US operations. The effect is to broaden the map of retaliation and to raise the costs not only for Washington and its partners, but also for the surrounding states whose territory hosts, supports, or is perceived to support America’s regional footprint.

This is where the crisis becomes qualitatively more dangerous. A conflict that threatens the Gulf is no longer only a regional confrontation but becomes a global economic stress test. The Gulf monarchies are the connective tissue of international energy markets and trade flows. When oil infrastructure and the maritime corridors around the Strait of Hormuz feel vulnerable, the consequences travel instantly – through shipping insurance, futures markets, investor confidence, and the risk calculations of governments far beyond the region. Oil prices have risen amid fears linked to strikes on regional oil infrastructure and tankers.

At the same time, the crisis is smashing one of the most durable assumptions of recent decades, namely the belief that the US, as the principal external power in the Gulf, can reliably guarantee the security of its traditional Arab partners under conditions of rapid escalation. The US retains enormous military capacity, but modern retaliation strategies are designed to evade a simple “shield.” When threats are dispersed and when the aim is to inject uncertainty into daily economic life rather than seize territory, even the most advanced defense posture can appear reactive. The political meaning of these matters. If Gulf capitals conclude that Washington’s umbrella is no longer sufficient – or no longer automatic – the entire regional security architecture starts to fracture.