BEIRUT- Lebanese society has long been marked by debates, disagreements, and deep ideological fault lines. Division is not a uniquely Lebanese pathology but a universal human reflex—dating back, as Rousseau suggested, to the moment the first man staked a claim and declared, “This is mine.”
But Lebanon’s fractures bear their own distinctive texture, shaped by sectarian memories, contested sovereignties, and the accumulated trauma of civil strife.
Its geopolitical borders rarely coincide with our cultural geographies, and this mismatch has always left Lebanon unusually exposed to regional tremors.
Today, the country is engulfed in a new kind of tremor: a suffocating saturation of “war talk.” Political salons, social platforms, and television panels have turned into speculative war rooms.
One camp summons war with reckless bravado; another fears it so intensely that it amplifies its inevitability. Both—intentionally or not—inject oxygen into the Israeli enemy’s psychological-warfare machine.
Since the November 27, 2024 sham ceasefire, Lebanon has been flooded with “operational forecasts” and “exclusive leaks.”
Each day brings a fresh recipe for apocalypse, predicting a war “more ruinous than any in the past century.”
The collapse of the Assad government on December 8, 2024 only widened the stage, triggering a wave of narratives about a “southeastern pincer,” a new Syrian front, and imminent preemptive strikes.
The question that dominates every platform—from policy institutes to village cafés—is no longer whether war is coming but why it hasn’t started yet.
Real threats vs. manufactured fear
Communities aligned with the Resistance are inundated with forecasts from both allies and adversaries. Some analysts warn the Israeli enemy could “strike before dawn.” Others insist the Pope’s visit offers no shield.
Rumors circulate about foreign intelligence calls warning of plans to “flatten the southern suburbs.”
This atmosphere creates a single shared perception: war is not a scenario—it is a calendar appointment. But strategic reality does not support this sense of inevitability.
The Israeli enemy faces profound structural constraints. Its army is overstretched, its deterrence damaged, and its political system cornered.
Netanyahu confronts what Israeli columnist Nahum Barnea called “the most existential political nightmare of any sitting prime minister.”
His approval rating fluctuates between 10% and 20%. Even as 60% of Israelis claim to support the Gaza war, only 30% believe Hamas can be eliminated.
Economically, the occupation entity is under immense pressure. Major firms are relocating, investors are withdrawing capital, and the tech sector—Israel’s crown jewel—lost more than 8,000 employees in a single year.
Regionally, Washington maintains its usual double game: enabling escalation when useful, curbing it when risky.
For now, the U.S. ceiling appears restricted to “precision intimidation”—limited airstrikes, media warfare, and controlled friction—not a full-fledged regional conflict.
In the contemporary landscape, battlefield victories no longer guarantee strategic success. Israel’s traditional narrative—anchored in Holocaust memory and allegations of antisemitism—has lost its hegemonic power.
Public opinion has turned decisively. Trump himself conceded this shift, telling Daily Caller in September 2024: “Israel is winning militarily, but losing in the court of public opinion.”
Netanyahu responded with delusion, branding American student protesters as “agents of Iran.”
Despite massive spending on PR firms, digital-influence operations, evangelical mobilization, and bot networks, the decline is measurable. Pew surveys show negative views of Israel climbing to 53% in 2025—a historic high.
International war-crime cases have further constricted Israeli decision-making. Under such conditions, launching a large-scale war on Lebanon would be politically suicidal, economically catastrophic, and strategically irrational.
Hence, Lebanon’s internal discourse often mirrors its anxieties more than its realities. When viewed solely from Beirut or the South, war may appear imminent. But when placed within the broader regional and global matrix, the conditions for an Israeli offensive simply do not exist.
The threats are real. The fear is understandable. Nevertheless, inevitability is a manufactured illusion, one the enemy eagerly cultivates and Lebanese discourse too easily reinforces. The task now is not to deny danger, but to distinguish between strategic risk and psychological manipulation.
Disclaimer : This story is auto aggregated by a computer programme and has not been created or edited by DOWNTHENEWS. Publisher: tehrantimes.com
