This major Eurasian myth should be put to rest

By Timofey Bordachev, Program Director of the Valdai Club

As the military-political confrontation between Russia and the West enters a new phase, attention is gradually shifting south and south-east. Discussions about Moscow’s policy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia are becoming more frequent, even if a definitive resolution to current tensions remains distant. In this context, it is worth asking whether the so-called ‘Great Game’ could return to Eurasia in some form.

Historically, both regions have been seen as relatively calm. Russia’s principal adversaries either lacked strong interests there or were unable to sustain a physical presence that Moscow would consider a serious threat. For much of the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and right up until the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, the states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus existed in what could be described as a favorable international environment. They faced internal challenges, certainly, but were largely spared from direct involvement in great-power rivalry.

Even today, these regions remain far removed from the principal theaters of global confrontation. When the world considers the possibility of serious conflict between nuclear powers, attention is directed towards Europe, East Asia, or increasingly the Middle East. Central Asia, often described as the “soft underbelly” of Russia or China, does not feature prominently in such calculations.

This is not to say that developments there are irrelevant. The South Caucasus, in particular, lies uncomfortably close to the Middle East, where Israel is seeking a more assertive regional role. Turkey too remains active, though the long-term trajectory of its ambitions is uncertain. Central Asia, for its part, has moved beyond the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse. Its political elites have stabilized their systems and are pursuing independent paths of development. The region is not without risks, but these stem primarily from domestic governance challenges rather than external pressure.

Nonetheless, a growing chorus of voices, particularly outside the region, now suggests that Central Asia could become the next arena for competition between Russia, China, the United States, and a range of secondary actors, including Turkey and the European Union. The argument is straightforward: as technology and economic cooperation become instruments of geopolitical rivalry, previously peripheral regions are being drawn into the contest.