West African regional army: Why thousands of soldiers are deploying

West African nations have agreed to activate a regional standby force to combat waves of violence by cross-border armed groups in the region.

The decision was made last week at a days-long security meeting of military chiefs of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Sierra Leone, the Anadolu news agency reported. The bloc held the meeting at a time when the region faces what experts said is an “existential security threat” that has seen thousands of people killed and hundreds of thousands displaced.

The plan includes mobilising an initial 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026 to tackle the armed groups, which are expanding their territory and sharpening tactics in the region.

Armed groups ideologically linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL (ISIS) have routinely attacked military outposts and civilian settlements from Mali to Nigeria. Countries are responding but in a fractured manner.

In particular, armed groups have targeted the Sahelian countries of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Increasingly, they are pressing into the coastal states of Togo and Benin.

Although fighters typically operate in rural areas with a weak government presence, recent attacks have been launched in major urban areas, and some groups are using more sophisticated weapons.

In one daring attack, an ISIL-allied group targeted the international airport in Niamey, the capital of Niger, at the end of January. In an ongoing operation, an al-Qaeda-linked faction has blocked fuel supplies from reaching the Malian capital, Bamako, since September, crippling mobility and essential services in the country.

If ECOWAS plans to deploy troops, however, it will have to overcome two major challenges, analysts said: funding and infighting that caused military-led Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso to split from the bloc in January 2025 to form their own Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

“Those challenges will persist, … but they’ll also have to think about this as not just a military response but a holistic operation that’ll include social interventions to halt the influence of these groups that allows them to recruit members,” said Dakar-based Beverly Ochieng of the intelligence firm Control Risks.

Here’s what we know about the plan so far and what challenges it might face:

What is the ECOWAS Standby Force?

The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) was officially formed in 1999 although it had begun deployments in the early 1990s. The force includes thousands of military, police and civilian staff contributed by ECOWAS member states.

The ESF has been crucial in ending several conflicts in the region and in stabilising states in transition. It is largely regarded as the first successful attempt at establishing a regional security alliance in Africa. Southern and East African states later created their own forces in 2007 and 2022, respectively.

Previously called the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the West African contingent was instrumental in ending protracted civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone from 1990 to 2003. Nigeria and Ghana sent the largest number of soldiers.

Unlike typical United Nations missions that focus on peacekeeping, ECOMOG engaged in combat. However, its troops were heavily criticised for rights violations as they struggled to differentiate rebels from the larger population.

The ESF intervened as a peacekeeping mission during the Ivorian civil war (2002-2003) and in the Mali crisis (2012-2013). The troops also helped force longtime Gambian President Yahya Jammeh to step down and hand over power to Adama Barrow, whom he had lost an election to. Most recently, the ESF supported the military of Benin to prevent rebels from seizing power in December.

What will the force do now, and what are the concerns?

As regional leaders plan a new mobilisation of thousands of soldiers, the proposed activation would specifically respond to threats posed by ideological armed groups, Anadolu News reported.

It would be the first time the ESF would face such armed groups as opposed to political rebels.

Such violence has resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of tens of thousands more in the region. From January to June 2025 alone, the region recorded 12,964 conflict-related fatalities in 5,907 incidents with nearly all deaths being in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, according to the Center for Democracy and Development.

The ECOWAS deployment is a belated response, and there are several concerns, Ochieng said. Funding, coordinating the force and a rift that has essentially fractured the bloc are the main issues.

Nigeria typically has provided 75 percent of personnel to ECOWAS missions and has been a major funder of ECOWAS, which has its headquarters in Abuja.

However, Nigeria of the 1990s was very different from the Nigeria of today, Ochieng noted. The country’s status as West Africa’s giant has declined in the face of economic mismanagement resulting in high inflation in 2023, adding to stress from the COVID-19 pandemic. The economy is slowly recovering.

Besides this, Nigeria’s defence forces are stretched on many fronts as they combat several armed actors. Ideological groups are operating in the northeast and increasingly collaborating with criminal bandit gangs in the northwest and north-central regions. In the country’s south, armed groups fighting for an independent state are also active.

One possible source of funding, Ochieng said, could be the United States, which has been working with Nigeria since December to fight armed groups after initially falsely accusing the country of enabling a “genocide” against Christians amid the insecurity. Another could be France, which is increasingly close to Abuja.

There’s also the issue of coordinating to fight at least eight armed groups that use heavily forested areas as hideouts and corridors to travel between countries. ECOWAS will have to “prioritise where operations should be and if there should be a focus on others, such as pirates or criminal gangs taking advantage of the security lapses”, Ochieng said.

Social interventions in rural areas from which armed groups recruit are crucial, she added. The groups often secure local buy-in by collecting taxes and providing resources such as fertiliser, building mosques or promising security.

Could the ECOWAS vs AES rift undermine the force?

There are also concerns about how ECOWAS would collaborate with the AES.

ECOWAS fractured last year after the regional bloc used sanctions to try to pressure the post-coup AES states to hold elections and return their countries to civilian rule.

All three AES countries are at the heart of the armed groups crisis with several armed groups operating along their shared borders.

The Malian army seized power in 2020, blaming the civilian government for failing to combat these fighters. Later, in 2022, Burkina Faso’s military followed, citing the same reasons, and in 2023, Niger did the same. They exited ECOWAS and officially banded together in 2025.

The AES has collectively turned away from France, its historical ally and former colonial power, which had contributed about 4,000 soldiers to combat armed groups, as Paris faced accusations of overly interfering in national security issues.

About 2,000 Russian fighters, initially from the paramilitary Wagner Group and now from the Russian state-controlled Africa Corps, have been deployed in the three countries as the AES has turned to Moscow as an ally.

The AES exit was a blow to ECOWAS, reducing the bloc’s size and influence. ECOWAS has tried to persuade the AES states to return through mediator states like Senegal, which maintains friendly ties with the Sahelians. The bloc has also maintained an open-door policy by inviting them to meetings.

But the military leaders have proved to be hardliners and have shunned those approaches, Ochieng said. The AES is working on building its 6,000-man combined force and wants to prove that it can compete with ECOWAS by successfully combating armed groups, she added.

Thus, a close collaboration where both sides deploy and fund a single regional force may not happen. However, ECOWAS’s new focus on countering armed groups could soften the AES’s stance over time.

“Because when AES left, one of their criticisms was that ECOWAS did not support counterterrorism and was overly focused on politics and elections,” Ochieng pointed out.

If ECOWAS continues to build on the friendly ties maintained by Senegal as well as Ghana and Togo, there could be room for intelligence sharing, joint surveillance and joint missions in the long term, she said.

What are the main armed groups?

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin: JNIM is the main al-Qaeda-allied faction in West Africa. It formed in 2017 after four Malian armed groups banded together (Ansar al-Din; al-Murabitun; the Macina Liberation Front, or MLF; and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM). JNIM operates in Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger and has recorded at least one attack in Nigeria. Presently, JNIM is blocking fuel from reaching Bamako by attacking and burning fuel tankers travelling on highways. It is estimated to have 5,000 to 6,000 members.

Boko Haram: The group is also known as Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad. Originating in Nigeria’s Borno State in 2010, Boko Haram initially launched widespread attacks across northern Nigeria, including in the capital, Abuja. It then spread to Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The group is notorious for kidnapping more than 300 schoolgirls in Chibok in 2014. Boko Haram has been severely weakened since the death of its leader, Abubakar Shekau, in 2021 but is still operating with an estimated 1,500 fighters.

ISIL affiliate in West Africa Province: ISWAP broke off from Boko Haram due to differences in how to treat Muslim civilians. Boko Haram indiscriminately kills Muslims and Christians. Both have increasingly engaged in violent battles. ISWAP mainly operates in northeastern Nigeria, and according to some estimates, has 3,500 to 5,000 fighters.

ISIL affiliate in Sahel Province: The ISSP or IS-Sahel group was formed in 2015 and also pledges allegiance to ISIL. It operates mainly in Niger and Mali. ISSP claimed the attack on Niamey’s international airport in January. Analysts speculated that components of ISWAP were involved, revealing the extent to which the groups collaborate across porous borders. Figures from 2018 put its fighters at more than 400.

Lakurawa: Although its alliances are unclear, Lakurawa appears to be made up of fighters from Mali. Some analysts believe the group’s members arrived in rural counties of northern Nigeria’s Kebbi State after locals invited them to battle criminal groups that were kidnapping people for ransom. Other scholars disputed this and said the Lakurawa members were originally cattle herders from Mali who morphed into fighters after arriving in the northwestern state of Sokoto. The group was the focus of Christmas Day air strikes by the US last year. It is believed to have about 1,000 fighters.

Ansaru: Another Boko Haram splinter group that’s now linked to al-Qaeda, Ansaru operates in northern Nigeria and has cooperated with criminal gangs to kidnap people for ransom. It has kidnapped foreigners from the United Kingdom, Lebanon, Italy, France and Greece from 2011 to 2013, executing most of them. There is speculation that Ansaru and JNIM work together and al-Qaeda is trying to create a West African arc by uniting its Sahelian and Nigerian branches. It has about 2,000 to 3,000 members.

Disclaimer : This story is auto aggregated by a computer programme and has not been created or edited by DOWNTHENEWS. Publisher: aljazeera.com