TEHRAN – Many assumed that Hamas’s offer to mediate between Yemen and Saudi Arabia was primarily an attempt to avoid choosing sides.
On the one hand, Hamas cannot afford to move in a direction that runs counter to many Arab and regional countries. This is particularly true of the countries that host senior members of the Palestinian resistance movement. It also applies to those working to mediate between Hamas and the Israeli regime, or leading reconciliation efforts between Hamas and other Palestinian parties.
Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, and some other countries have all made no secret of their sympathy and solidarity with Saudi Arabia.
On the other hand, Hamas cannot disregard what its own officials call a “blood partnership” with Ansarallah. That partnership was manifested in Ansarallah’s decision to militarily support Gaza. It was also evident in its missile and drone attacks on Tel Aviv and deep inside territories occupied by the Zionist regime.
The Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) also succeeded in disrupting the regime’s port of Eilat. The port remains severely impaired, reducing its operating capacity by 85 percent, according to Israeli sources.
The resulting war subjected Yemen to thousands of Israeli and U.S. airstrikes. Washington eventually reached a separate agreement with Ansarallah. It also did so without requiring Ansarallah to refrain from targeting the occupation regime’s interests and assets in the Red Sea or on land.
The conflict exacted a heavy toll on Ansarallah and on Yemen as a whole. Many senior political and military leaders were killed alongside civilians. A wide range of civilian and economic facilities were also damaged or destroyed.
But the real surprise came during a private meeting with one of Hamas’s senior leaders. He revealed that the initiative had not originated with Hamas. It had come from the government in Sanaa itself.
Ansarallah were the ones who asked Hamas to intervene. They specifically wanted the movement to act through the three-party mediation channel working on Gaza: Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt. They hoped the mediators could open a political and negotiating track between Sanaa and Riyadh.
The objective was to move beyond a simple de-escalation. A truce alone, Ansarallah argues, could never produce lasting peace and stability. The remaining economic, financial, and political issues would also have to be addressed.
That, according to the Palestinian Hamas leader, was the position conveyed by Ansarallah.
Hamas subsequently passed Ansarallah’s proposal on to the three mediating parties. It appears that Hamas has virtually no direct channel to Riyadh. The movement itself is also not regarded by Saudi Arabia as the most suitable mediator.
Ansarallah is well aware of this. Their calculation instead rested on the close relationships Hamas has developed with the three members of the Gaza mediation triangle. The response from the parties concerned, however, has not been sufficiently positive to suggest that this track is likely to be activated anytime soon.
Analysts believe Saudi Arabia is not yet ready for an initiative of this kind. Riyadh does not want to publicize its role in the war. It also sought to avoid that role during the de-escalation and ceasefire negotiations of 2022 by emphasizing it was a Yemeni-Yemeni conflict.
Significance of the initiative
Ansarallah’s initiative, which was entrusted to Hamas, comes against the backdrop of the close and mutually reinforcing relationship between the two allies. It also recalls a proposal made by Sayyed Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in 2020.
At the time, Sayyed al-Houthi offered to exchange a Saudi pilot held by his group for the release of several Hamas members detained in the Kingdom.
Hamas welcomed Ansarallah’s proposal, but Saudi Arabia ignored it. The detainees were eventually released between 2022 and 2024. This happened either as a result of third-party mediation efforts or because their prison sentences had expired.
Today, Ansarallah’s initiative appears intended, among other things, to strengthen Hamas’s political standing and give the movement greater credit.
Some Arab and international actors view Hamas as part of the region’s problems. Through this initiative, Ansarallah appears to be trying to present Hamas instead as part of the solution.
However, the initiative remains at a very early stage. Quite frankly, it may already have died there. Nevertheless, the initiative carries several messages for Yemeni and regional actors. The first message is that Ansarallah is not just attached to Tehran and the IRGC.
The Sanaa government does not conceal its alliance with Iran or the ties that bind it to Tehran. Yet, according to most assessments, Ansarallah acts according to its own calculations and interests. At the same time, they take care, wherever possible, not to stray too far from the Islamic Republic.
The second message is that the movement is seeking to build relationships with the most influential and major Arab and regional powers. There is little doubt that Ansarallah is closely watching the increasingly prominent roles being played by the three mediators.
This applies both to the wider illegal war against Iran and to the conflicts unfolding close to Yemen. These include the conflicts on the other side of the Red Sea, around the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and in the Horn of Africa. None of these conflicts is remote from Yemen. Nor are they remote from the regional actors involved.
The third message Ansarallah wants to convey is that however long a “truce” may last, it is not a solution. Four years after the guns fell silent, the parties have still failed to put the remaining outstanding issues on a genuine path toward resolution. These include sanctions, the blockade, salaries, fuel, ports, and airports.
Under such circumstances, it was only natural that the conflict would eventually erupt again. This has happened in conflicts and disputes around the world. The underlying causes remain unresolved, and the roots of the conflict continue to run deep.
The fourth message is that war is not a solution in Yemen. It was not the answer during the seven-year war, and it will not be the answer going forward. Economic isolation and blockade, combined with the absence of any political horizon, are a recipe for renewed conflict. They are not a way to preserve the already difficult status quo indefinitely.
The initiative and the regional framework
The Yemeni initiative that Hamas has brought into the public arena fits into the broader effort to establish a regional framework for cooperation and collective security.
Qatar presented this concept from the highest UN platform. Oman’s foreign minister subsequently elaborated on it in two articles published in France’s Le Monde and Britain’s The Economist.
There appears to be a new trend among some Arab and regional actors. They seem increasingly willing to embrace containment rather than exclusion, participation rather than domination, and cooperation rather than confrontation.
If this concept of collective security is given a chance to take shape, one of its priorities should be to address the region’s various unresolved problems. They should be placed on a path toward comprehensive negotiated settlements. Such an approach would need to safeguard the legitimate and balanced interests of neighboring states.
Yemen may well be the first to require a political solution. The alternative is to embark on another dangerous conflict. The region may recognize it has begun, but it has no way of knowing how or when it will end. The case for diplomacy, dialogue, and negotiation becomes even stronger given the limited appetite among regional and international actors for escalation, military victory, mobilization, and the beating of war drums.
The U.S. has shown no willingness to launch another round of aggression against Ansarallah. Neither have the three mediators for Hamas. Pakistan and Turkey, which formed the “Mecca” alliance with Riyadh, have not joined Saudi airstrikes in Yemen either. As Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar indicated, they favor a political solution.
Some observers, however, believe that the mediating parties’ reluctance to become directly involved in Yemen may stem from a different calculation. They assume that without resolving the larger regional conflict, it is impossible to resolve the smaller conflicts. That argument is generally valid, but it is not always true.
If influential actors within local conflicts are prepared to engage, limited solutions and interim settlements may still be possible. Such steps could become part of a longer process of confidence-building within the region.
There is therefore nothing wrong with giving Hamas some of the credit it deserves. The mediators need some of it as well. They are facing the fascism of the Israeli regime, its dismissal of any initiatives or roadmaps, and its determination to continue waging wars.
Disclaimer : This story is auto aggregated by a computer programme and has not been created or edited by DOWNTHENEWS. Publisher: tehrantimes.com
