If there’s anyone who knows just how much pressure Donald Trump is heaping on allies to lift defence spending, it’s Richard Marles.
The message was received loud and clear when he met his US counterpart, Pete Hegseth, in Singapore nearly a year ago.
Angry at Nato and other countries Trump views as leeching off the US for security, the zero sum president insisted Australia must lift spending to 3.5% of GDP.
Instead of admitting they would bring forward decisions and increase budgets, Marles and Anthony Albanese played down the demands from Washington. Spending decisions, they said, would not be based on arbitrary goals, but instead on the basis of need.
So it was surprising on Thursday when Marles suddenly used the release of Australia’s latest national defence strategy to measure total defence spending in Nato terms, pointing out that by 2033, Australia will be above the 3% of GDP threshold. Earlier, he had announced defence spending would rise to about 2.4% of GDP over the next decade.
In an address to the National Press Club, Marles said the government would spend $14bn more over the four-year forward estimates period, and $53bn more over the next decade.
By his count, that means that Labor has increased defence spending by about $117bn over 10 years, compared with the former Coalition government. About $5bn in so-called “reprioritisations” would free up cash. The cuts include scrapping 10 Spartan c-27J small transport planes.
Marles said that was how you compare “apples with apples”.
But, like so much in the defence portfolio, the figures are as clear as mud.
Nato rules account for major projects and procurement differently to Australia’s federal budget. As Australian Strategic Policy Institute researcher Linus Cohen has noted, while costs in Australia are spread out over the lifetime of a major asset, like a new warship, members of the 32-country bloc report spending when the ship is built and the bill is paid.
Some budget spending that sits outside the defence portfolio would also be included in the 3% total for Australia, including the costs of international intelligence activities and superannuation entitlements for service members.
On the Aukus nuclear submarines agreement, Marles says the picture is clear.
Asked if the 2023 cost estimate of the controversial $368bn project is still current, he argued the best way to understand the total price tag is to consider it at about 0.15% of GDP over the life of the project. Initially unwilling to give a figure, Marles argues there hasn’t been a significant increase in the cost of nuclear subs.
But spending over the next decade on Aukus has increased from the $53bn-to-$63bn range provided in the last defence strategy two years ago, to between $71bn and $96bn over the same period today. The government says that change is related to the progress of related infrastructure, including the Osborne shipyard in South Australia and the Henderson base in Western Australia.
Under the Aukus deal, the first Virginia Class submarine from the United States is due to arrive in Australia in 2032, with another arriving every four years, before the bespoke Australian-built model starts coming online in 2042.
Perhaps frustrated at criticism from the opposition, the press gallery and defence commentators, Marles was pointed in his speech, insisting that increases in spending did not happen because of thinktanks, retired generals “or washed-up bureaucrats”.
On his own test – comparing apples with apples – Thursday’s explanation lacked the transparency Marles says Australian taxpayers expect and deserve.
Disclaimer : This story is auto aggregated by a computer programme and has not been created or edited by DOWNTHENEWS. Publisher: theguardian.com
