TEHRAN – “There is no trust in the words and promises of the enemy, and what matters to us are concrete achievements that must be obtained.” This statement by Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, head of the Iranian negotiating team in the Islamabad talks with the US for ending the war in the region, reflects a broader and long-standing approach in Iran’s foreign policy toward Washington.
According to this view, experience has shown that Washington’s promises are not reliably binding and can easily shift with changes in political conditions or strategic calculations. Within this framework, agreements are not seen as permanent guarantees, but rather as temporary tools for managing on-the-ground conditions, which is why the principle of practical verification has always taken precedence over political trust. From this perspective, even during direct or indirect talks, the dominant assumption is that US behavior must be assessed through action rather than rhetoric or written commitments, as the history of relations between the two countries has repeatedly shown that the gap between promises and actual behavior can shift quickly, and this gap has become one of the core foundations of structural mistrust between Tehran and Washington.
Against this backdrop of deep mistrust toward US, the Islamabad memorandum of understanding between Iran and US was signed on Thursday morning. This agreement came to fruition in a period in which Trump repeatedly adopted threatening positions toward Iran throughout the negotiation process and even during sensitive phases related to the ceasefire. These threats included references to military options, warnings about swift and severe responses, and the use of maximum pressure rhetoric alongside diplomatic channels. This simultaneity between negotiations related to the agreement and the release of threatening messages created an atmosphere of structural uncertainty from the very beginning of the talks.
Even at the moment of signing this agreement, the dominant approach in Iran was one of structural skepticism and maximum caution. This skepticism was not merely the result of isolated events, but rather the outcome of a long historical experience of fluctuations in relations between the two countries, repeated breakdowns or redefinitions of agreements, and continuous changes in Washington’s approach toward Tehran.
In the literature of international relations, mistrust is generally not a momentary feeling; it is the product of accumulated historical experience, security perceptions, behavioral changes, and even ideological differences. In the case of Iran–US relations, this pattern is clearly visible. From the perspective of many Iranian analysts, diplomacy with US has always operated under a structural shadow of doubt, a doubt that is not only political but also security-related and identity-based.
However, it is not only Iranian analysts who believe that relations between Iran and US are based on mistrust. Gary Sick, professor at Columbia University, Middle East expert, and author of several books on Iran–US relations, argues: “Iranians have strong reasons not to trust us.” Jack Straw, former British Foreign Secretary, also stated: “Many Iranians, across different political orientations, do not trust US for many reasons.”
But why do we not trust US?
Mistrust toward US is not an isolated incident, but part of a broader and recurring pattern in which Iran has concluded that engagement with US always carries security risks and political instability. In the following sections, seven main roots of this mistrust are analyzed.
1. A history of broken commitments; the historical memory of relations
Iran’s mistrust of US in diplomacy cannot simply be considered the result of occasional disputes or political misunderstandings. Rather, this mistrust is based on a long and accumulated historical experience in which the pattern of “commitment–change–violation” has been repeated many times. In the mindset of Iranian policymakers, relations with US have always been based on the assumption that international commitments are not necessarily stable and may change with shifts in political conditions or Washington’s domestic interests.
A key reference point in this mindset is the nuclear agreement, which was formed as a multilateral deal involving world powers. From Iran’s perspective, this was not a simple bilateral agreement, but a complex legal and political structure that was expected to be more stable than ordinary agreements. However, the US withdrawal under Trump in 2018 challenged this fundamental assumption and sent a clear message that even multilayered international agreements can be vulnerable to the political will of a single administration in Washington.
But this issue is not limited to that event. From the Iranian point of view, the history of relations between the two countries includes a series of experiences starting from the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh and continuing through various periods of sanctions, economic pressure, and shifts in foreign policy. This historical repetition has created an institutional memory in which mistrust is not a temporary feeling, but a structural assumption in decision-making.
This historical experience has transformed mistrust from an emotional reaction into a structural element in foreign policy analysis, so that every new agreement must be evaluated in the light of past experiences.
2. The personality of Trump and the crisis of predictability in relations
The Trump presidency was a turning point in which Iran’s mistrust of US moved from a historical level to a behavioral and operational one. During this period, US foreign policy was more than ever influenced by individual decisions, momentary perceptions, and media reactions. This created a fundamental problem for Iran: a severe reduction in the predictability of the counterpart’s behavior.
While indirect negotiations were underway to manage tensions and design a limited agreement, contradictory messages were simultaneously coming from Washington. On one hand, dialogue was not fully rejected, and on the other hand, explicit military threats and economic pressure were being discussed. This simultaneity blurred the boundary between diplomacy and pressure.
From Iran’s strategic analysis, this situation sent a clear message: decision-making in US can change rapidly and is not necessarily based on a stable institutional logic. This is particularly important when long-term agreements are involved, as such agreements require a minimum level of stability in behavior.
The dual nature of this behavior sends a dangerous message in Iranian analysis: lack of stable decision-making. Even if an agreement is reached at the diplomatic level, it may later be delegitimized at the political or media level.
The core issue is not what Trump said or did, but that the US political system allows such sudden and drastic changes in foreign policy at the presidential level—creating structural uncertainty.
3. The role of Israel in foreign policy and its impact on US decision-making
One of the important elements shaping Iran’s mistrust of US is the role of Israel in regional dynamics and its influence on US policy. This issue is not limited to bilateral relations but extends to Iran’s perception of the decision-making structure in Washington.
From this perspective, US policy toward Iran is not merely the result of an independent and centralized decision, but part of a complex network of interests, alliances, and security considerations. Within this network, Israel and pro-Israel lobbying groups in US are seen as influential actors in shaping Washington’s security priorities in the Middle East.
From this viewpoint, it must be considered that some pressure policies, sanctions, or even diplomatic frameworks may be influenced by overlapping security interests between US and Israel. This perception turns bilateral diplomacy into a multi-layered and complex relationship.
In such conditions, the main issue for Iran is not only the content of negotiations, but the decision-making structure of the other side. In other words, whether any agreement is purely between two governments or is influenced by other actors and therefore subject to change.
This network-based perception of power increases uncertainty and makes trust-building more difficult, since the greater the number of actors involved in a decision, the lower its predictability and stability.
4. Broken commitments in diplomacy and attacks during negotiations
One of the most important factors shaping mistrust in Iran–US relations is the repeated experience of negotiations occurring simultaneously with increased political, economic, and security pressure. This pattern has been observed in various forms over the years and became more intense during the Trump era.
In this framework, Iran has repeatedly experienced situations in which diplomatic channels were active while economic pressure increased or political and military threats escalated. Iran and US were engaged in negotiations last June when Israel launched attacks against Iran, and shortly afterward US joined these attacks and the president supported them. These attacks lasted 12 days and began with the assassination of military commanders and scientists, resulting in the deaths of more than a thousand Iranians.
Again, a few months after the 12-day war, during another round of negotiations and just two days after talks, on February 28, US and Israel launched another war by assassinating Iran’s Supreme Leader and several military commanders.
After about 40 days of war, a ceasefire was announced to allow negotiations to take place. During all these days, US officials and the president repeatedly issued statements threatening Iran with attacks and destruction of infrastructure. This situation has led Iranian policymakers to view diplomacy and pressure not as separate paths but as complementary tools within a single strategy.
This interpretation has an important consequence: negotiations are no longer seen as a path to de-escalation, but as part of managing escalation within a pressure framework. Therefore, entering negotiations does not necessarily mean a change in behavior from the other side, but may itself be part of pressure tactics.
As a result, even the start of negotiations is accompanied by high levels of caution, as they may not reduce tensions but instead stabilize or even increase pressure. This is one of the most important factors weakening trust in diplomatic processes.
5. Policy changes toward Iran with changes of government in US
Another major root of mistrust is the domestic political structure of US and its impact on foreign policy. In the US political system, changes in administration can lead to significant shifts in foreign policy approaches.
At one point, US policy may move toward engagement and negotiation, while at another it shifts toward maximum pressure and confrontation. This volatility has led Iran to conclude that US policy toward Iran is more driven by internal political competition than by a stable national strategy. A clear example is the nuclear deal, which was signed under Obama and unilaterally withdrawn by Trump.
This creates a fundamental problem for diplomacy, as long-term agreements require the assumption that the other side will remain committed over time. When there is a possibility of complete policy reversal after elections, this assumption is weakened.
As a result, even if an agreement is signed to reduce tensions or end an indirect conflict, there is always concern that future US administrations may revise or cancel it.
6. Planning for regime change in Iran
One of the deepest layers of mistrust in Iran–US relations is the concern over long-term intentions related to changing Iran’s political structure. In Iranian security analysis, this is considered a long-term strategic variable.
One of the goals attributed to US officials in past statements was regime change in Iran. This goal was reportedly pursued through support for protests and armed opposition groups before the war, although it did not succeed. Even after the war, US officials continued to refer to and support opposition movements in public statements.
In this framework, even if official US policy emphasizes negotiation and engagement, actions such as broad sanctions, structural economic pressure, or political support for opposition groups are interpreted as signals of a broader strategic objective.
Importantly, failure of such policies is not necessarily seen as abandonment, but as tactical adjustment. Therefore, it is not only current behavior that matters, but also perceived long-term intent.
7. Ideological mistrust
The final factor is ideological and structural mistrust. At this level, mistrust is no longer a reaction to past experience, but a permanent principle in foreign policy.
In official Iranian discourse, there is a key principle that can be described as strategic mistrust of adversaries. This view is based on the assumption that in relations with hostile powers, full trust can lead to security vulnerability.
In this logic, relations with major powers must be defined through risk management, vulnerability control, and preservation of strategic independence. Therefore, even when agreements exist, a structural level of mistrust remains constant.
This approach means diplomacy is based not on full trust, but on constant caution, continuous verification, and risk management.
In sum, Iran’s mistrust of US cannot be reduced to a single incident or a specific historical period. This situation is not the product of one isolated factor, but rather the result of an accumulation of multiple historical, political, and strategic layers. From past experiences of violations or alterations of agreements, to the shifting structure of US domestic politics, from the role of regional actors in shaping Washington’s priorities, to the repeated experience of simultaneous negotiation and pressure—all of these elements have contributed to a perception that diplomacy with US is always exposed to reversals and sudden changes.
Within this context, the Trump era pushed this mistrust to a new level, as the simultaneity of negotiations over the memorandum of understanding and explicit military threats reinforced the perception that diplomacy and coercion do not operate as opposing tools, but rather as parallel and complementary instruments. This dynamic meant that even at the moment of signing the agreement, the dominant outlook in Iran was not one of optimism about the future, but rather one of risk management and continuous assessment of the counterpart’s behavior.
At the same time, this mistrust is not merely a reaction to past behavior. Over time, it has become embedded as part of Iran’s decision-making logic in foreign policy. In other words, even when a formal agreement exists, a baseline of caution and structural skepticism remains in place, because the underlying assumption is that changes in the political environment in US can lead to changes in commitments.
Disclaimer : This story is auto aggregated by a computer programme and has not been created or edited by DOWNTHENEWS. Publisher: tehrantimes.com
