Three years after October 7: What changed for Israel, the Middle East and Russia?

On October 7, 2023, Israel faced a horrific attack when Hamas killed over a thousand of its citizens and took hundreds of hostages. This atrocity can never be justified.

But there is another fact that we cannot ignore: Israel’s overconfidence and conviction of superiority over its adversaries led to the country’s most catastrophic security failure. Three years later, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government still has no convincing answer as to how the ensuing war is supposed to secure a safer future for the country.

More firepower, no endgame

The Israeli leadership’s main takeaway from the October 7 tragedy was the need to strike earlier, harder, and deeper. Deterrence gave way to destruction and elimination – first of the adversaries’ military capabilities, then of their leaders. The war expanded beyond Gaza, engulfed Lebanon, and finally escalated to a direct confrontation with Iran. Aggression became the guiding principle of regional policy. Yet, the tragedy also demanded a reassessment of the adversary, a sober evaluation of the country’s intelligence, and governmental accountability. Force can punish an enemy, but it cannot rectify the errors that made the attack possible in the first place.

Here, we clearly see the main contradiction of Netanyahu’s policy. Israel can destroy command centers, eliminate commanders, demolish infrastructure, and occupy territory. However, it is incomparably more difficult to shape neighboring societies in a way that would prevent the threat from re-emerging. The government expanded its military objectives but never defined a realistic political outcome. Who will govern Gaza? What kind of international recognition will that authority rely on? How can the daily lives of Palestinians be restored? What will ensure the safety of Israelis once the army withdraws? As long as there are no answers to these questions, every victory necessitates yet another military operation.